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At first glance, corporate waste makes no sense. The very 
definition of waste—a transaction so one-sided that no reasonable 
business person would enter into it, an act equivalent to gift or 
“spoliation”—suggests that it would never occur, for what 
corporation would ever enter into a transaction so absurd? Yet 
waste claims are regularly made against corporate managers. 
Respected judges have downplayed waste as a “vestige” and 
described it as “possibly non-existent,” the Loch Ness monster of 
corporate law; but waste survives. It is a remnant of ultra vires, a 
doctrine proclaimed largely dead for the last hundred years—but 
waste is not dead. It confounds our model of managerial 
responsibility; after decades in which corporate directors’ and 
officers’ duties have been focused into the fiduciary duties of care 
and loyalty, waste sits outside that framework, for historically 
waste isn’t a fiduciary duty at all. This Article, the first modern 
survey of the corporate waste doctrine, discusses the origin of 
corporate waste, documents and explains its survival, and 
tentatively foresees its demise. 
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I. Introduction: Waste’s Confusions 
At first glance, corporate waste makes no sense. The classic 
definition of waste1—a transaction in which “what the 
corporation has received is so inadequate in value that no person 
of ordinary, sound business judgment would deem it worth what 
the corporation has paid,”2 an act equivalent to “gift” or 
“spoliation” of corporate assets—suggests that waste should 
never arise, for what corporation would ever enter into a 
transaction so absurd?3 Yet waste claims are regularly made. The 
conventional wisdom is that waste claims never succeed;4 but 
                                                                                                     
 1. In this Article I usually refer to “corporate waste” as simply “waste.” 
Other bodies of law, notably property, have their own waste doctrines, which are 
unconnected to corporate waste. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 
329, 432 (3d ed. 2010) (overviewing property law and the distinct waste doctrine 
in that area of the law). While this Article focuses on waste in corporations, 
waste can also be found in other business entities. See Trover v. 419 OCR Inc., 
397 Ill. App. 3d 403 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2010) (discussing waste in LLCs); 
Williams v. Habul, 219 N.C. App. 281, 283 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (discussing a 
corporate waste claim, among others, brought by an LLC owner against a 
second owner in the same LLC); Thomas E. Rutledge, The 2010 Amendments to 
Kentucky’s Business Entity Laws, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 383, 413 n.245 (2011) (“While 
typically seen in the context of corporations, waste can also occur (and is equally 
actionable) in the context of a partnership.”). 
 2. Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962). 
 3. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 59 (Del. 1952). 
 4. See, e.g., Rudolf Koch & Christopher Lyons, Delaware Insider: Executive 
Compensation Lessons from Freedman v. Adams, BUS. LAW. TODAY (March 
2013), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2013/03/delaware_insider.html 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (“Traditional compensation claims, alleging that 
particular compensation were excessive and thereby constituted corporate 
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empirical studies show that at some stages of litigation they do,5 
and some of the most significant corporate law cases of the last 
decade have dealt with corporate waste.6 Respected judges have 
called for sharply limiting it, referring to it as a “vestige”7 and 
deriding it as the mythical “Loch Ness Monster” of corporate law; 
still, waste survives.8 It is a remnant of ultra vires, a doctrine 
proclaimed dead for the last hundred years—but waste is not 
dead.9 It confounds our model of managerial responsibility; after 
decades in which discussion of directors’ and officers’ duties have 
focused on the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, waste still sits 
outside that framework, for waste until now has not been seen as 
an aspect of fiduciary duties at all.10  
                                                                                                     
waste, have not fared well under Delaware law. Most fail the rigors of Rule 23.1 
and are dismissed at the pleading stage.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 5. See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating 
Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 
573–85 (2001) (documenting survival of waste claims at various stages of 
litigation). 
 6. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 73–75 
(Del. 2006) (concluding that payment of a severance package did not amount to 
waste); In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 135–40 
(Del. Ch. 2009) (finding that shareholders were unable to show that demand 
was futile on waste claims relating to a stock repurchase program). 
 7. Harbor Fin. Partners v Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 882 (Del.Ch. 1999). 
 8. See Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384, 387 (Del.Ch. 1997) (reviewing 
the Plaintiff’s assertion that he has pleaded cognizable claims of waste). 
 9. On other surviving remnants of ultra vires, see, for example, STEPHEN 
M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 30–33 (3d ed. 2015) (explaining MBCA 
§ 3.04(b)’s three “limited exceptions under which the ultra vires doctrine has 
some lingering validity”); Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder 
Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With Notes on How Corporate Law Could 
Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1314–51 (2000) 
(determining that illegal activities and the non-profit sector serve as a place for 
the “surviving vestige of ultra vires doctrine”). 
 10. See In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 35 (describing the distinct concepts 
of fiduciary breach and committing waste). On recent developments in Delaware 
fiduciary law, see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, R. Franklin 
Belotti, & Jeffrey M. Gorris, Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good 
Faith in Corporate Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 673–90 (2010) (describing the “rise 
and fall” of certain fiduciary concepts and their implications moving forward); 
Robert Thompson, The Short, but Interesting Life of Good Faith as an 
Independent Liability Rule, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 543, 544 (2010) (examining 
“why good faith gained such added prominence during [the] recent period and 
what its eclipse tells us about the evolution” of fiduciary duty law”).  
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This Article is the first modern study thoroughly canvassing 
waste—its origins, growth, present role, and future prospects.11 It 
proceeds as follows. Part II tracks the prehistory of waste in the 
ultra vires doctrine—the now largely discarded set of rules that 
barred corporations from acting for purposes not spelled out in 
their corporate charters—focusing particularly on the strand of 
ultra vires eventually reworked as waste, the ban on gifts by a 
corporation.12 Part III demonstrates how this ban on gifts was, 
starting in the 1930s, reworked into the modern doctrine of 
corporate waste in a series of cases, which sought to rein in 
executive compensation and police the growth of new methods for 
compensating corporate executives.13 There is a reason waste 
appeared at this time, when limits on corporate activity were 
                                                                                                     
 11. Other modern articles have looked at waste in particular contexts. See, 
e.g., Joseph K. Leahy, Are Corporate Super PAC Contributions Waste or 
Self-Dealing?, 79 MO. L. REV. 283, 303–10 (2014) [hereinafter Leahy, Super PAC] 
(examining different approaches to corporate waste and concluding that a 
shareholder lawsuit challenging a typical Super PAC contribution is unlikely to 
succeed on a theory of waste); John W. Murrey, III, Excessive Compensation in 
Publicly Held Corporations: Is the Doctrine of Waste Still Applicable?, 108 W. 
VA. L. REV. 433, 453–57 (2005) (concluding that Delaware “has failed to apply 
the traditional doctrine of waste” in recent decisions); William A. Nelson, II, 
Post-Citizens United: Using Shareholder Derivative Claims of Corporate Waste 
to Challenge Corporate Independent Political Expenditures, 13 NEV. L.J. 134, 
138–39 (2012) [hereinafter Nelson II, Post-Citizens United] (introducing the 
history and evolution of waste case law in Delaware). Several very good student 
Notes have also been written on the topic. See Steven C. Caywood, Note, 
Wasting the Corporate Waste Doctrine: How the Doctrine Can Provide a Viable 
Solution in Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
111, 135 (2010) (concluding that a “revitalized corporate waste doctrine would 
allow shareholders to have some meaningful power as a safeguard against a 
board of directors that excessively compensates executives”); Charles Gass, 
Note, Outer Limits: Fiduciary Duties and the Doctrine of Waste, 92 DENV. U. L. 
REV. ONLINE 93, 104 (2015) (surveying waste doctrine’s application under 
Delaware Law and through an empirical analysis determined that waste claims 
are “infrequent”); Eric L. Johnson, Note, Waste Not, Want Not: An Analysis of 
Stock Option Plans, Executive Compensation, and the Proper Standard of Waste, 
26 J. CORP. L. 145, 146 (2000) (determining the proper standard of waste in 
Delaware and addressing whether current treatment of corporate waste in the 
Court of Chancery is proper); Jamie L. Kastler, Note, The Problem with Waste: 
Delaware’s Lenient Treatment of Waste Claims at the Demand Stage of 
Derivative Litigation, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1899, 1901 (2011) (arguing that Delaware 
courts should explicitly place waste under the obligation of good faith).   
 12. Infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part III (outlining waste’s emergence in the compensation, 
charitable gift, and political donation contexts). 
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eroding but courts’ need to investigate and cast light on 
questionable corporate decisions was not. Waste would be the 
first of a series of “equitable safety valves”—what Robert 
Thompson has dubbed judicial “fail-safe devices”—allowing courts 
to scrutinize and second-guess corporate decisions that did not 
clearly violate fiduciary duties, but also made little sense as the 
products of careful business judgment.14 This Part also shows 
how waste, once developed, was deployed—largely 
unsuccessfully—to challenge other novel corporate expenditures, 
notably charitable and political donations.15 Part IV follows 
waste’s oscillating fortunes into the first decade of the 
twenty-first century.16 Courts were rarely comfortable with 
waste’s ill-defined scope, letting it languish for decades, and even 
calling for its limitation or revision in the 1990s. Yet waste also 
had its uses, and occasionally found favor in courts’ eyes, notably 
in the landmark Disney litigation.17 Part V moves toward the 
present day, observing that waste is losing its independent 
existence as courts have found in the revivified duty of good faith 
both an alternative doctrinal safety valve for questioning 
corporate decisions and a means to transplant waste into the 
modern framework of corporate fiduciary duties.18  
II. Waste’s Origins 
Waste has its roots in ultra vires,19 the doctrine flourishing in 
the nineteenth century, which held that directors had no power to 
                                                                                                     
 14. See Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 895 (Del. Ch. 
1999) (describing corporate waste and the continued utility of an “equitable 
safety valve”). See generally THOMPSON, infra note 28. Thompson’s influence on 
this Article should be clear. 
 15. Infra notes 135–142. 
 16. Infra Part IV. 
 17. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. 2006) 
(discussing a shareholder suit questioning the Disney board’s decisions with 
respect to the firm’s number-two officer and his proposed generous termination 
benefits). 
 18. Infra Part V. 
 19. As recognized, e.g., both by scholars, see ERIC CHIAPPINELLI, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ENTITIES 385 (3d ed. 2014) (noting that waste is a 
remnant of the ultra vires doctrine) and courts, see Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 
327, 335–36 (Del. Ch. 1997) (linking waste to ultra vires). 
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“perform[] acts outside the corporation’s authority” as spelled out 
in its charter or general law.20 Ultra vires embodied the 
nineteenth century’s belief that the corporation was a creation of 
the state, possessing only such powers provided by the state in its 
charter, and constantly threatening to exceed its bounds.21 Ultra 
vires acts were those “not merely irregular in form or done by 
unauthorized organs, but acts which the corporation could not 
legally do in any manner without having first changed its 
constitution.”22 The doctrine was well-established by 1855, when 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Dodge v. Woolsey23 held that courts 
have “jurisdiction over corporations, . . . to restrain those who 
administer them from doing acts which would amount to a 
violation of charters.”24 While ultra vires’s main justification was 
in protecting society from corporations’ potentially overweening 
power, it also served to protect shareholders from corporate 
controllers’ departure from the corporation’s limited scope.25 In an 
era lacking many modern checks on managerial discretion such 
as mandatory disclosure or efficient capital markets, ultra vires 
was another means to discipline agents and, together with the 
fiduciary constraints on negligence, fraud, and self-dealing, was a 
major guarantor of faithful corporate governance.26 
                                                                                                     
 20. ERNST FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS §§ 36 (1897). On 
the history of ultra vires, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960, at 77–79 (1992) (describing ultra vires doctrine’s 
treatment during the period of 1870–1960); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE 
AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 59–64 (1991) (discussing its history in the 
section on “Classicism and Ultra Vires”); Greenfield, supra note 9, at 1302–14 
(explaining the history of ultra vires through a “rise and fall” narrative). 
 21. See HENRY W. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 67 (1927) 
[hereinafter BALLENTINE 1927] (describing the basis of the ultra vires doctrine); 
David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 212, 218–19 
(1990) (connecting ultra vires to artificial entity theory of the corporation). 
 22. FREUND, supra note 20, at 62. 
 23. 59 U.S. 331 (1855). 
 24. Id. at 341. 
 25. See, e.g., FREUND, supra note 20, at 62 (“[An ultra vires] act may 
constitute a violation . . . in two different directions; as against the associates 
who do not concur in it is a breach of contract or trust; as against the state it is a 
breach of a limitation imposed upon the body corporate . . . .”). 
 26. See Greenfield, supra note 9, at 1304–07 (noting the surviving 
remnants of ultra vires, on which modern waste law is based). On fiduciary 
duties in the nineteenth century, see, e.g., JOSEPH KINNICUT ANGELL, SAMUEL 
AMES & JOHN LATHOP, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
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Ultra vires was a more inflexible curb on a corporation’s 
managers than were fiduciary duties. While the fiduciary duties 
tested whether managers used their powers carefully and loyally, 
ultra vires asked whether they possessed power to act at all. 
Under ultra vires, directors and officers who acted beyond the 
corporation’s powers were liable—perhaps absolutely—for such 
acts.27 According to a leading treatise, Thompson on 
Corporations,28 unlike with fiduciary duty analysis, liability for 
an ultra vires act did not generally turn on intent or state of 
mind:  
The rule is that if directors of a limited company apply the 
money of the company for purposes so outside its power that 
the company could not sanction such application, they may be 
made personally liable as for a breach of trust; but if they 
apply the money of the company, or exercise any of its powers, 
in a manner which is not ultra vires, then a strong and clear 
case of malfeasance must be made out to render them liable 
for a loss thereby occasioned to the corporation.29 
Fletcher on Corporations30 made a similar point; for a court “to 
enjoin ultra vires acts . . . it is not necessary that there shall be 
                                                                                                     
AGGREGATE 325 (9th ed. 1871) (noting that directors can be called to account if 
they “made themselves answerable by their negligence or fraud”). 
 27. If an ultra vires act was not yet executory, shareholders could seek an 
injunction preventing it and in extreme situations the state could seek a quo 
warranto proceeding to revoke the corporate charter. See GEORGE WASHINGTON 
FIELD, THE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES: ILLUSTRATED AND EXPLAINED BY SELECTED 
CASES, CLASSIFIED AND FULLY ANNOTATED 229 (1881) (“The general rule is that if 
a corporation is about to engage in an enterprise not authorized by the charter 
or [lacking in the corporate provisions,] a court of equity will, by injunction, 
restrain such acts . . . for the protection of the rights of stockholders.”); see also 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, at 58–64 (discussing ultra vires). 
 28. SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS (1908); see also Sheldon v. Bills, 166 N.W. 117, 117 (Neb. 1918) 
(noting that directors who expend a sum “for a purpose beyond their powers as 
directors . . . will be personally liable for the loss” and that directors’ “honest 
belief at the time that such action [would] result in such benefit to the company 
will not relieve them from liability”). But see Spering’s Appeal, 71 Pa. 11, 24 
(1872) (stating that directors may not be liable for ultra vires action in a case 
where the corporation’s charter was so complicated that even with due care they 
could have made a mistake regarding it). 
29.  THOMPSON, supra note 28, at 300. 
 30. WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 6 CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS (1919) [hereinafter FLETCHER ON CORPORATIONS]. 
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any intentional wrong or actual fraud on the part of the officers 
or other stockholders. It is enough that the act be ultra vires.”31 
The rigidity of ultra vires’s limits also helps explain a feature 
that would survive into waste; a majority of shareholders could 
not ratify ultra vires acts in the face of a single shareholder’s 
dissent, even though a majority did have the power to ratify other 
acts that may have exceeded a corporate agent’s express 
authority.32 In a typical ratification, a principal is asked to affirm 
a transaction that it had the power to enter into, the problem 
being that the particular agent lacked authority to commit the 
principal to it.33 In ultra vires situations, in contrast, the 
corporation itself lacked power to enter into the transaction.34  
Ultra vires was an often-litigated and befuddling topic; 
according to one authority, there was “perhaps no part of the law 
concerning corporations in which we meet with so much 
difficulty, confusion, and conflict of opinion.”35 During the 
doctrine’s heyday, when corporations had narrow and specific 
purposes, courts frequently found themselves finely parsing 
charter provisions to determine whether the power to perform a 
particular act could be discerned in a corporation’s enumerated 
                                                                                                     
 31. Id. § 4062. 
 32. See, e.g., Endicott v. Marvel, 87 A. 230, 233 (N.J. Ch. 1913) (“The 
transactions of a board which cannot be sustained against the will of a single 
stockholder . . . are acts which are either ultra vires, fraudulent, or illegal.”); 
FLETCHER ON CORPORATIONS, supra note 30, § 4062 (“[A]ny misapplication or 
diversion of assets to purposes not authorized by its charter, even though all 
other stockholders may consent, is a breach of trust toward a dissenting 
stockholder.”). 
 33. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) 
(defining ratification). “Ratification” is also a technical term under Delaware 
corporation law used at times in a different sense. See Corwin v. KKR Fin. 
Holdings, LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 309–11 (Del. 2015) (“Instead, the Chancellor read 
Gantler as a decision solely intended to clarify the meaning of the precise term 
‘ratification.’”); J. Travis Laster, The Effect of Stockholder Approval on 
Enhanced Scrutiny, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1443, 1446, 1480–91 (2014) (“Vice 
Chancellor Jacobs . . . argued for the need to distinguish between (1) ratification 
in its ‘“classic” or paradigmatic form,’ . . . and (2) ‘the effect of an informed 
shareholder vote that was statutorily required for the transaction to have legal 
existence.’”). 
34. See City of Harper Woods Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Olver, 577 F. Supp. 2d 
124, 134 (D.D.C. 2008) (discussing ultra vires as “lack of capacity”).   
35. See BALLANTINE 1927, supra note 21, § 67 (noting the immensely 
complicated and inconsistent application of ultra vires law). 
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purposes; cases examined whether, for instance, a railroad 
company could pay for improvements on a resort hotel located on 
the railroad’s line,36 or whether a company chartered to 
manufacture musical instruments could guarantee the expenses 
of a musical festival that would increase the manufacturer’s 
sales.37  
A few acts, however, were held to be ultra vires for any 
corporation.38 Most important for this Article, gifts—donations for 
which the corporation would receive nothing in return—were 
invariably ultra vires. According to Morawetz on Corporations,39 
the “property and funds of a corporation . . . cannot be devoted to 
any use which is not in accordance with their chartered purposes, 
except by unanimous consent. No agent of a corporation has 
implied authority to give away any portion of the corporate 
property . . . gratuitously.”40 Forty years later Ballantine on 
Corporations41 reported the same limit, with the same 
explanation: “[A] gift of its property by a corporation not created 
for charitable purposes is in violation of the rights of the 
stockholders and is ultra vires[.]”42  
While gifts were a distinct category of ultra vires acts, 
corporate waste was not. As a distinct doctrine and cause of 
action, corporate waste did not yet exist. Nineteenth century 
cases certainly refer to “waste,” but the term characterized the 
result of a range of disfavored actions and could be the result of 
                                                                                                     
36. See W. Md. R. Co. v. Blue Ridge Hotel Co., 62 A. 351, 357 (Md. 1905) 
(concluding that the “hotel company has paid nothing and parted with nothing 
under this contract, and is therefore, under all the authorities, without any 
right of action”). 
37. See Davis v. Old Colony R.R. Co., 131 Mass. 258, 258–59 (1881) (finding 
that the agreement is ultra vires, and therefore no action can be maintained 
upon it against either defendant). 
38. See, e.g., FLETCHER ON CORPORATIONS, supra note 30, § 3424 (noting 
that torts and crimes are always ultra vires). 
39. 1 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
(1886). 
40. Id. at 399. Authorities were divided on whether an apparent gift that 
was “really for the benefit of the corporate enterprise,” and so not truly 
gratuitous, was ultra vires. Id. at 424. 
41. BALLANTINE 1927, supra note 21. 
42. Id. at 207–08. 
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either a violation of fiduciary duties or an ultra vires act.43 For 
example, in 1832 Robinson v. Smith,44 one of the first American 
cases dealing with directors’ fiduciary duties, New York’s 
Chancellor held that, 
[directors of a] joint-stock corporation, who willfully abuse 
their trust or misapply the funds of the company, by which a 
loss is sustained, are personally liable as trustees to make 
good their loss. And they are equally liable, if they suffer the 
corporate funds or property to be lost or wasted by gross 
negligence and inattention to the duties of their trust.45  
In the 1847 Massachusetts case Smith v. Hurd,46 “waste” 
similarly described the result of a violation of fiduciary duties; 
according to Chief Justice Shaw, the case concerned “various acts 
of negligence and malfeasance . . . in consequence of which . . . the 
whole capital of [a] bank was wasted and lost.”47 That said, the 
term certainly could also characterize the result of ultra vires 
acts. In Gilbert v. Finch,48 a 1903 Massachusetts case, the 
directors of an insurance company used company funds to 
purchase control of another insurance company in violation of the 
first company’s charter.49 The court found that the directors had 
acted in good faith, but their transaction still “was ultra vires, 
and constituted a waste of the funds” of the company.50 Only in 
the twentieth century would “waste” take on a distinctive 
meaning in corporation law.  
                                                                                                     
43. See Rabe v. Dunlap, 25 A. 959, 961 (N.J. Ch. 1893) (“A corporation holds 
its property as the trustee of its stockholders, and they, like any other cestui que 
trust, have a right to have the trust property judiciously and honestly managed, 
and preserved from waste and misappropriation.”). 
44. 3 Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1832). 
45. Id. at 231. 
 46. 53 Mass. 371 (1847). 
 47. Id. at 383; accord ANGELL, AMES & LATHROP, supra note 26, at 325 
(discussing “waste or misapplication of the corporate funds” in a section 
discussing officers’ duties and obligations); see also THOMPSON, supra note 28, at 
278 (“Directors are held personally liable for suffering the corporate funds or 
property to be wasted or lost by gross negligence or inattention to their duties.”). 
 48. 66 N.E. 133 (N.Y. 1903). 
 49. See id. at 133 (noting that the directors took $35,000 from the company 
and purchased the new insurance companies with the money). 
 50. Id. at 134; accord THOMPSON, supra note 28, at 300 (“Directors may be 
personally liable where they engage in a business not within the corporate 
powers, and thereby waste or lose the corporate assets.”). 
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III. Waste’s Emergence 
Waste did not emerge until the twentieth century, but ultra 
vires had largely disappeared by the end of the nineteenth.51 It 
was a doctrine for an economic world where corporations were 
creations of the state, strictly limited to a few purposes, and 
mistrusted. By early in the twentieth century, however, 
Americans were becoming more comfortable with corporations, 
coming to view them not as threatening monoliths wielding 
special powers but as merely another form in which to conduct 
business.52 Limits on corporate purpose rapidly eroded, and it 
soon became possible to charter a corporation “for any lawful 
business purpose.”53 By the 1920s ultra vires mostly lingered as a 
dubious mechanism by which some corporations attempted to 
“evade liability upon an irksome contract, by showing [their] 
incapacity to make the contract.”54 Yet while the broader 
                                                                                                     
 51. See HORWITZ, supra note 20, at 78 (“Even within the last remaining 
bastion of the ultra vires rule, the law of contracts, courts after the Civil War 
had begun a retreat.”). 
 52. See MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND 
ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900–1933, at 89–91 (1990) (noting the 
increased acceptance of the corporation as a natural rather than artificial 
entity). This is not to say that opposition to the giant corporation ever 
completely disappeared. 
 53. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Statutory Developments in Business 
Corporation Law, 1886–1936, 50 HARV. L. REV. 27, 29 (1936) (noting new 
business corporations acts allowing for the formation of corporations for any 
lawful purpose); Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr., Significant Trends in Modern 
Incorporation Statutes, 22 WASH. U. L.Q. 305, 317–18 (1937) (“All of the new 
statutes seem to abandon the old attempt at enumeration of specific types of 
businesses open to incorporation.” (quotation at 317)). Intriguingly, it may be 
that restrictive purpose clauses are making a comeback in limited liability 
companies, leading one to wonder whether litigation over LLC purpose can be 
far behind. See Suren Gomtsian, Contractual Mechanisms of Investor Protection 
in Non-Listed Limited Liability Companies, 60 VILL. L. REV. 955, 984 (2016) 
(stating that these company-purpose limitation clauses were used to reduce the 
discretion of the management); Peter Molk, How Do LLC Owners Contract 
Around Default Statutory Provisions?, 42 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2017) 
(discussing how LLCs maneuver around default provisions through operating 
agreements). My thanks to Professor Mohsen Manesh for this information. 
 54. See BALLANTINE 1927, supra note 21, at 235 (achieving this by 
extending the doctrine to relations with third parties). The prevailing view of 
ultra vires by the 1920s is shown by the header to Ballantine’s discussion: 
“Basis of the doctrine of ultra vires—The defense of ultra vires is frequently not 
meritorious.” Id. at 234. Ultra vires has survived in nonprofit law. See Henry 
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strictures of ultra vires disappeared, the prohibition on gifts by 
corporations persisted, and would in the 1930s be seized upon 
and reworked by courts and litigants into the doctrine of 
corporate waste. The rest of this Part will look at the 
development of corporate waste from the 1930s to the 1950s, 
particularly in an area where many of the most important 
decisions occurred: executive compensation. It will then more 
briefly examine two other areas where waste was repeatedly 
invoked, the laws of charitable gifts and political donations.55 
A. Compensation 
Most of the waste doctrine’s development and elaboration 
would come in a series of challenges to executive compensation.56 
Even before this, though, ultra vires’s ban on gifts had been 
applied to some forms of officer and director compensation. 
Corporations could not, for example, decide after the fact to 
compensate officers or directors for past services: 
When an officer is not impliedly entitled to compensation for 
services, a vote or other promise by the directors or 
stockholders to pay him therefor given after the services have 
been performed, is not only without consideration, and void as 
a promise on that ground, but is also ultra vires, as a 
misapplication of the corporate funds.57  
                                                                                                     
Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights: 
Separation of Ownership and Consumption, 123 YALE L.J. 948, 990 (2014) 
(stating that the use of ultra vires has continued to exist but in a weakened form 
in the context of nonprofit corporations); see also infra notes 165–169 and 
accompanying text (discussing corporate waste). 
 55. See infra Sections III.B–C (outlining statutes and case law present in 
both areas of charitable gifts and political donations where waste was invoked). 
 56. See, e.g., Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 585 (1933) (filing a claim to 
dispute the validity of an agreement between stockholders and the vice 
president and president to pay the officers large amounts of money in addition 
to their salaries); McQuillen v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 112 F.2d 877, 883–84 
(4th Cir. 1940) (stating that courts ordinarily will not review directors’ decisions 
to fix salaries except when the directors improperly elect to give themselves 
excessive salaries). 
 57. BALLANTINE 1927, supra note 21, at 410. This doctrine did not apply 
“under such circumstances as to raise an implied promise.” Id. 
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There was also some language in treatises that suggests that 
excessive compensation could be treated as a gift. Fletcher on 
Corporations reported that “in the case of exorbitant and 
unreasonable salaries, the court may, on the petition of the 
minority stockholders, enjoin the payment of such salaries.”58 It is 
unclear whether this targeted compensation that involved 
self-dealing by corporate controllers, as hinted by the reference to 
“minority stockholders,” or all compensation, but the idea could 
clearly be stretched in the latter direction.59 
The doctrine of corporate waste “[was] nurtured, if not 
spawned”60 in the classic case of Rogers v Hill,61 a challenge to 
compensation that reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1933.62 
Before discussing that case, though, we should ask why courts 
developed corporate waste as a distinct doctrine in the 1930s. By 
the 1920s, ultra vires had almost completely disappeared, along 
with rigid corporate codes and narrow corporate purpose 
provisions in corporate charters.63 Fiduciary duties still 
functioned to limit managerial malfeasance, but they were most 
effective at blocking self-dealing.64 Other familiar tools for 
checking managers and protecting shareholders, such as the 
market for corporate control and robust disclosure requirements, 
did not yet exist to any great degree. Managerial power and 
overreach enabled by increasingly dispersed shareholding were, 
                                                                                                     
 58. FLETCHER ON CORPORATIONS, supra note 30, at 4038; see also THOMPSON 
supra note 28, at 848 (“[E]xcessive and extravagant salaries to officers must be 
viewed in the light of a waste of corporate assets.”). 
 59. FLETCHER ON CORPORATIONS, supra note 30, at 4038 (citing Mathews v. 
Headley Chocolate Co., 100 A. 645 (Md. 1917)). 
 60. Victor Brudney, Revisiting the Import of Shareholder Consent for 
Corporate Fiduciary Loyalty Obligations, 25 J. CORP. L. 209, 210 n.7 (2000). 
 61. 289 U.S. 582 (1933). 
 62. Id. I discuss this case in Harwell Wells, “No Man Can Be Worth 
$1,000,000 a Year”: The Fight over Executive Compensation in 1930s America, 
44 U. RICH. L. REV. 689, 724–37 (2010), from which the discussion of Hill and its 
progeny is drawn. 
 63. See 1 W. COOK, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS HAVING A 
CAPITAL STOCK, vii–viii (4th ed., Callaghan 1898) (“The doctrine of ultra vires is 
disappearing.”). 
 64. See, e.g., In re Allen-Foster-Willett Co., 116 N.E. 875, 876 (Mass. 1917) 
(“Obviously, Allen, while a director of the company charged with the duty of 
conserving its monetary welfare for the benefit of all concerned, could not 
lawfully buy at a discount claims against it.”). 
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however, becoming public issues—as shown by the popularity of 
William Z. Ripley’s 1927 exposé Main Street and Wall Street65 
and then Adolf Berle & Gardiner Means’s 1932 The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property.66 The Great Depression only 
heightened hostility to corporations and corporate management.67 
Given all this, we should not be surprised that in the 1930s 
courts were motivated to seek additional tools to police corporate 
activity, and to find in waste a “fail-safe doctrine[] to enable 
courts to review director conduct that seem[ed] to satisfy 
traditional standards used to test director behavior, but where 
the decision simply [didn’t] make sense.”68  
Rogers was a challenge to a bonus plan at American 
Tobacco.69 The plan resulted from a corporate bylaw adopted in 
1912 allocating 10% of the firm’s net profits above a fixed amount 
to its six senior executives.70 By 1930 the payments were, by 
contemporary standards, huge. For example, American Tobacco’s 
president received a $168,000 salary and an $842,507 bonus that 
year.71 News of this and similar payments at other firms sparked 
public outrage and a series of lawsuits.72 In Rogers, shareholders 
attacked the payments under several theories, losing at the 
Second Circuit before winning in front of the Supreme Court.73 
Their challenges turned on both technicalities of corporate law 
(for example, whether the bylaw was properly adopted) and more 
                                                                                                     
 65. WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (1927). 
 66. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
 67. See Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Evolution of the Modern Corporation: 
Corporate Governance Reform in Context, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1001, 1023 
(stating that due to the Great Depression “corporations cut wages, reduced 
production, and laid off workers”). 
 68. Thompson, supra note 10, at 544. 
 69. See Rogers v. Hill, 60 F.2d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 1932) (stating that a 
shareholder sought to invalidate the by-laws of the American Tobacco 
Company). 
 70. See id. (seeking to invalidate Article XII of the bylaws). The bonus was 
10% of profits above $8,222,245, which was the profit earned by American 
Tobacco in 1912; in 1930, the firm’s profits exceeded $20,000,000. Id. at 113. 
 71. Id. at 114 (Swan, J., dissenting). 
 72. See Wells, supra note 62, at 709–13 (discussing such lawsuits). 
 73. See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 585 (1933) (“Plaintiff maintains that 
the by-law is invalid and that, even if valid, the amounts paid under it are 
unreasonably large and therefore subject to revision by the courts.”). 
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general assertions that the payments were inequitable; but the 
latter was a difficult case to make. The bonuses were not per se 
illegal under corporate law, nor the product of self-dealing (the 
bylaw had been adopted well before any of the recipients joined 
the company), and there was, the court concluded, no “inference 
of actual or constructive fraud.”74 Despite this, the Supreme 
Court held that the bonuses could be challenged in court; “the 
payments under the by-law,” it held, had “become so large as to 
warrant investigation in equity.”75 Quoting a dissent from the 
lower court, it stated “the applicable rule: ‘If a bonus payment has 
no relation to the value of services for which it is given, it is in 
reality a gift in part, and the majority stockholders have no power 
to give away corporate property against the protest of the 
minority.’”76  
This statement summarizes corporate waste in its modern 
form: a transaction in which a corporation has received 
something that has “no relation to the value . . . for which it is 
given,” a “gift in part,” one forbidden by the well-established 
principle that corporations cannot make gifts.77 Though clearly 
drawing on ultra vires, Rogers announced a new rule, seemingly 
rooted in equity, prohibiting not only corporate transactions in 
which there is no consideration at all—gifts—but transactions in 
which there was no substantial connection between what the 
corporation gave and what it received.78 Applying this rule, 
though, would pose problems for courts traditionally reluctant to 
become too involved in corporate decision-making, a reluctance 
already embodied in the longstanding business judgment rule.79 
                                                                                                     
 74. Id. at 584–85. 
 75. Id. at 591. 
 76. Id. (quoting Rogers v. Hill, 60 F.2d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 1932) (Swan, J., 
dissenting)). 
 77. Id. I have found no case before Rogers using the term “gift in part” to 
describe waste or ultra vires actions; its last Delaware use is in Saminsky v. 
Abbott, 185 A.2d 765, 770 (Del. 1961) (applying waste doctrine to a common-law 
business trust). 
 78. The Court cites earlier cases for this proposition, but those cases 
involved self-dealing by corporate controllers. See, e.g., Rogers v. Hill, 60 F.2d 
109, 114 (2d Cir. 1932) (Swan, J., dissenting) (citing Endicott v. Marvel, 87 A. 
230 (N.J. Ch. 1913); Collins v. Hite, 153 S.E. 240 (W. Va. 1930)). 
 79. See Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: 
Business Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 412 n.33 
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Compensation was, after all, rarely a pure gift.80 Would courts 
actually venture to weigh corporate payments, at least those 
lacking indicia of self-dealing, to determine when they were so 
extravagant as to constitute gifts in part?  
The answer, it became clear over the rest of the decade, was 
no. After Rogers, a series of cases would challenge executive 
compensation as violating the rule handed down in Rogers, but in 
not a single one did plaintiffs win.81 Courts’ hesitant approach 
was summed in a 1939 case, McQuillen v National Cash Register 
Co.,82 where the court made clear that it would not second-guess 
pay merely because it appeared high: “We must distinguish 
between compensation that is actually wasteful, and that which 
is merely excessive. The former is unlawful, the latter is not.”83 
Waste only existed, according to the court, where there had been 
“a failure to relate the amount of compensation to the needs of 
the particular situation by any recognized business practices, 
honestly, even though unwisely adopted—namely, the result of 
bad faith, or a total neglect of or indifference to such practices.”84 
At least regarding executive compensation, waste already seemed 
a dead letter. 
A handful of cases asserting waste did succeed, but in these 
the compensation at issue was payment for past services not 
granted until after service was performed.85 In Fidanque v. 
                                                                                                     
(2013) (noting the long history of the business judgment rule in Delaware). 
 80. Compensation payments awarded after services were rendered, such as 
a bonus on retirement, were sometimes treated as gifts—payments made 
without consideration. Infra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 81. Some cases would count as wins for plaintiffs because the investigation 
into pay packages discovered other wrongs, such as overpayment of bonuses due 
to miscalculations. One court, in examining a complex bonus plan at General 
Motors, did state that it would have found that bonuses paid during the 1920s 
were wasteful, had the claim not been time-barred. Winkelman v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 44 F. Supp. 960, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). 
 82. 27 F. Supp. 639 (D. Md. 1939). 
 83. Id. at 653. 
 84. Id. 
 85. On this rule, see ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 195–97 
(1986) (citing Adams v. Smith, 153 So. 2d 221 (Ala. 1963), as a case involving a 
minority shareholder successfully challenging payments that the corporation’s 
board of directors ordered). There were also cases claiming waste that appeared, 
on close inspection, to be about self-dealing. See, e.g., Cullen v. Governor Clinton 
Co., 110 N.Y.S.2d 614, 617 (N.Y. App. Div. 1952) (holding salary paid to 
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American Maracaibo Co.,86 the court found a consulting contract 
for a retired officer to be waste because the payments were chiefly 
for past services, holding “[t]he fact that the contract may 
constitute a gift in part only does not help . . . since a totally 
inadequate consideration would invoke the same principles of law 
as the absence of any consideration.”87 On similar grounds, a few 
courts held that pensions awarded to the widows of corporate 
officers could also be wasteful. In Moore v. Keystone Macaroni 
Manufacturing Co.,88 for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court held that a board’s decision to pay the widow of the 
company’s founder and president $25,000 a year “in recognition of 
the long and valued services rendered to [the] corporation . . . by 
her deceased husband”89 was ultra vires and against the general 
rule forbidding a corporation to “give away, dissipate, waste or 
divert the corporate assets.”90 
This advance and retreat in the 1930s would be the first in a 
repeated pattern of ups and downs in waste’s career.91 First 
would come a moment when there appeared to be the need for an 
“equitable safety valve” allowing scrutiny of corporate acts not 
obviously violative of the fiduciary duties, a moment in which 
courts would invoke the waste doctrine and threaten to give it 
broad application.92 Once this passed, though, courts would 
                                                                                                     
controlling shareholder for hotel management, when management contract was 
already in place, wasteful). 
 86. 92 A.2d 311 (Del. Ch. 1952). 
 87. Id. at 321 (citing Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933)); accord Fogelson v. 
Am. Woolen Co., 170 F.2d 660, 663 (2d Cir. 1948) (“A retirement plan which 
provides a very large pension to an officer who has served to within one year of 
the retirement age without any expectation of receiving a pension, would seem 
analogous to a gift or bonus.”). 
 88. 87 A.2d 295 (Pa. 1952). 
 89. Id. at 297. 
 90. Id. at 298 (citing 6 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS 667–68 (perm. ed.)); accord Adams v. Smith, 153 So. 2d 221, 224 
(Ala. 1963) (finding payment to widow ultra vires). 
 91. A point made in Thomas & Wells, infra note 97, at 858 (“By one 
estimate, executive compensation did not again attain the heights of the early 
1930s until the end of the 1980s.”). 
 92. See Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 895 (Del. Ch. 
1999) (“Although I recognize that our law has long afforded plaintiffs the 
vestigial right to prove that a transaction that a majority of fully informed, 
uncoerced independent stockholders approved by a non-unanimous vote was 
wasteful, I question the continued utility of this ‘equitable safety valve.’”). 
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retreat from waste and return to their general deference to the 
business decisions of unconflicted directors as embodied in the 
business judgment rule.93 Waste would never disappear, but it 
would only rarely gain any traction.94 We can see this in the 
1950s challenges to stock option compensation, and in a related 
area in challenges to mutual fund fees.95 It is also this time when 
we see Delaware law become central to the development of the 
waste doctrine.96 
The stock option cases are probably better known.97 In 1950, 
changes in tax law made it easier for corporations to award stock 
options grants as compensation.98 Such “restricted stock option 
grants” would become popular for executives as they were often 
taxed at rates lower than the then-sky-high marginal income tax 
rates.99 Yet options grants were worrisome; they were hard to 
value (pre Black-Scholes) and threatened to allow managers to 
transfer ownership to themselves, a longstanding fear of 
reformers.100 In 1952, the Delaware Supreme Court decided two 
major cases asserting such grants were waste: Gottlieb v. Heyden 
                                                                                                     
 93. See, e.g., HENRY W. BALLANTINE, LAW OF CORPORATIONS, 160–61 (rev. ed. 
1946) [hereinafter BALLANTINE 1946] (“Courts will not, in general, undertake to 
review the expediency of contracts or other business transactions authorized by 
their directors. . . . But it is presumed in this ‘business judgment rule’ that 
reasonable diligence and care have been exercised.”). 
 94. See Thomas & Wells, infra note 97, at 857 (“Executive compensation 
faded as an issue at the end of the 1930s.”). 
 95. See id. at 868–69 (“During the 1950s, the prevalent issue concerning 
executive compensation in the Delaware courts was the validity of corporate 
stock option grants.”). 
 96. Rogers v. Hill was a U.S. Supreme Court case interpreting New Jersey 
law, but was “long incorporated in Delaware law.” 1 R. FRANKLIN BALLOTTI & 
JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATIONS § 4.11 (2d ed. Supp. 1992). 
 97. My discussion of the stock option cases draws on Randall S. Thomas & 
Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the Courts: Board Capture, Optimal 
Contracting, and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. L. REV. 846, 868–73 
(2011). Delaware law had allowed stock options since at least 1929, but their 
widespread popularity was new to the 1950s. See Grimes v. Alteon, 804 A.2d 
256, 263–64 (Del. 2002) (“The predecessor provision to Section 157 was first 
passed in 1929, the first statute in the nation expressly to authorize the 
issuance of options.”). 
 98. For a discussion of this tax change, see Steven Bank, Brian Cheffins & 
Harwell Wells, Executive Pay: What Worked?, 42 J. CORP. L. 59, 77 (2016). 
 99. See id. 
 100. See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 66, at 180–85. 
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Chemical Corp.,101 and Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways.102 
The claims in the two cases were identical: that the options were 
given for no cognizable consideration and were therefore 
equivalent to gifts.103 
Waste allowed the courts to make a more searching 
examination of this relatively novel form of compensation than 
did traditional fiduciary duties; one observer even claimed that 
such close scrutiny was “an un-Delaware-like approach.”104 What 
professedly worried the court in these cases was the possibility 
that the grants would be given for little consideration, or be 
structured so that the corporation never received the promised 
consideration at all.105 To avoid either possibility, in Kerbs the 
court handed down a two-part test for option grants—a test 
arguably more demanding than the traditional test for waste.106 
The court held, first, that there needed to be “a reasonable 
relationship between the value of the services to be rendered by 
the employee and the value of the options granted,” which echoed 
the basic test for waste and would prevent the options being 
exchanged for a peppercorn.107 Second, the court required that 
                                                                                                     
 101. 90 A.2d 660, 664 (Del. 1952). 
 102. 90 A.2d 652, 656–58 (Del. 1952). 
 103. In both cases the plans were adopted by boards whose members might 
receive the options, but were subsequently ratified by shareholders, which 
would have the effect of curing any taint of self-dealing “unless the action of the 
directors constituted a gift of corporate assets to themselves or was ultra vires, 
illegal, or fraudulent.” Kerbs, 90 A.2d at 655; see also Gottlieb, 90 A.2d at 665 
(“Ratification by stockholders, indeed, is frequently decisive of controversies in 
this field of law.”). 
 104. Harry G. Henn, Book Review, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 574, 576 (1964). 
 105. See Kerbs, 90 A.2d at 657  
Sufficient consideration to the corporation may be, inter alia, the 
retention of the services of an employee, or the gaining of the services 
of a new employee, provided there is a reasonable relationship 
between the value of the services to be rendered by the employee and 
the value of the options granted as an inducement or compensation. 
 106. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (“If, however, 
there is any substantial consideration received by the corporation, and if there is 
a good faith judgment that in the circumstances the transaction is worthwhile, 
there should be no finding of waste, even if the fact finder would conclude ex 
post that the transaction was unreasonably risky.”). 
 107. Kerbs, 90 A.2d. at 656; see also Haft v. Dart Group Corp., Civ. A. No. 
13736, 1994 WL 643185, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 14, 1994) (“The legal test of 
corporate waste is more demanding than a peppercorn standard . . . .”). 
1258 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1239 2017) 
there be “circumstance which may reasonably be regarded as 
sufficient to insure that the corporation will receive that which it 
desires to obtain by granting the options.”108 Because under the 
plan challenged in Kerbs an employee could, theoretically, receive 
the options, quit, and immediately exercise them, the court held 
that the option grants did not meet its test—they did not ensure 
that the airline would receive the employees’ services it had 
bargained for.109 Note that this test was applied ex ante; the 
possibility that an employee could take the options and run 
rendered them waste, even if in fact the employee stayed at the 
firm.110  
Yet having invoked waste to make its point, the court then 
avoided repeating the exercise in subsequent cases. This was in 
part due to statutory change; Delaware’s legislature amended its 
corporation law in 1953 to make clear that a board’s judgment 
concerning consideration for options would be conclusive “absent 
fraud.”111 More consequentially, when a stock option case again 
reached the Delaware Supreme Court, in 1960’s Beard v. 
Elster,112 the court weakened the rule adopted in Kerbs.113 While 
reciting that the rule remained unchanged, the court 
distinguished Kerbs from Beard by noting that in the former case, 
the options had been granted by a self-interested board and only 
later ratified by shareholders.114 In Beard, in contrast, approval 
                                                                                                     
 108. Kerbs v. Cal. E. Airways, 90 A.2d 652, 657 (Del. 1952). 
 109. Id. The court in handing down this rule cited Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit 
Corp., a case of gross self-dealing where the controlling stockholder of a 
corporation awarded himself a large in the money options grant. 60 A.2d 106, 
109 (Del. Ch. 1948). 
 110. In Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., a similar options plan was 
considered, but the case was remanded to Chancery to determine whether there 
was “consideration which has a value reasonably related to the concessions 
made by the corporation.” 90 A.2d 660, 666 (Del. 1952). 
 111. See 2 GEORGE THOMAS WASHINGTON & HENRY V. ROTHSCHILD, 2ND, 
COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 569, 578–79 & n.43 (3d ed. 1962). 
 112. 160 A.2d 731 (Del. 1960). 
 113. See id. at 737 (“It is true that Kerbs and Gottlieb lay down a 
fundamental rule governing all stock option plans, however adopted.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 114. See id. at 737–39 (“[I]n the Kerbs case, the fact that the Directors who 
voted in favor of the plan were permitted by the plan to leave the company’s 
employ . . . impaled the plan upon the prong of failure to provide reasonable 
safeguards that the corporation would receive the contemplated benefit . . . .”). 
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had been given by disinterested directors and then ratified by 
shareholders; in such a situation, the court concluded, the 
business judgment rule would be appropriate, and a court would 
be “precluded from substituting [its] uninformed opinion for that 
of experienced business managers . . . who have no personal 
interest in the outcome.”115  
Waste’s limited utility was made plain as well in challenges 
to compensation in mutual funds. After suffering a collapse in the 
1930s, the mutual fund industry made a comeback following 
World War II as cautious investors saw mutual funds as a way to 
participate in the stock market.116 Under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940—which reconstituted the industry—mutual 
funds had an unusual managerial structure: each fund was a 
separate investment company with its own board, which 
contracted with an adviser to actually run the fund; the structure 
was intended to prevent advisers from simply looting 
wholly-owned funds, as had allegedly occurred in the 1930s.117 
The funds were in fact creatures of the adviser, however, creating 
a thicket of conflicts. Many observers came to believe this allowed 
advisers to pry “excessive” payments from supine, controlled 
boards.118 
                                                                                                     
 115. Id. at 738. For a retrospective on Delaware’s changing approach to 
stock options, see Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336–39 (Del. Ch. 1997) (“In 
Beard v. Elster . . . the Delaware Supreme Court relaxed slightly the general 
formulation of Kerbs et al., and rejected the reading of Kerbs to the effect that 
the corporation had to have (or insure receipt of) legally cognizable 
consideration in order to make an option grant valid.” (quotation at 337)). 
 116. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY 
OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 
222–31 (3d ed. 2003) (“After the 1929 stock market crash, the reputation of the 
investment companies declined even more rapidly than it had grown in the 
previous three years.”). 
 117. See Alfred Jaretzki Jr., The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 303, 308–10 (1941) (“The original bill to regulate investment companies 
followed in many respects the pattern of recent federal legislation.” (quotation at 
308)); Note, The Mutual Fund and Its Management Company: An Analysis of 
Business Incest, 71 YALE L.J. 137, 137 (1961) (“The mutual fund sells its own 
shares to the public. Governed by the investment decisions of its management 
company, it then invests the proceeds in marketable securities.”). See generally 
WILLIAM BIRDTHISTLE, EMPIRE OF THE FUND 29–49 (2016). 
 118. See COMM. ON INTERSTATE FOREIGN COMMERCE, REPORT OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF 
INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. NO. 89-2337, at 12 (1966) (Conf. Rep.) 
(“The courts have held that since the contracts under which the fees were paid 
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In the 1950s and 1960s, almost fifty lawsuits were filed 
alleging that payments to mutual fund advisers constituted 
waste.119 The typical claim was that advisers did not adjust their 
fees—usually 0.5% of assets under management—as funds grew, 
even though economies of scale meant that expenses did not 
increase at the same rate as did a fund’s size.120 Most of the 
claims ended in minor settlements, but a few went to trial, 
including what became the leading case, Saxe v Brady,121 a 1961 
Delaware action. The plaintiffs lost, but the court did lay out 
what became one of the classic definitions of waste:  
[W]hether what the corporation has received is so inadequate 
in value that no person of ordinary, sound business judgment 
would deem it worth what the corporation has paid. If it can be 
said that ordinary businessmen might differ on the sufficiency 
of the terms, then the court must validate the transaction.122  
Under this approach, for a fee to be found wasteful, noted one 
respected jurist, it would have to be not just “unreasonable,” but 
“unreasonably unreasonable.”123 Strikingly, in the case of mutual 
funds it was the very difficulty of satisfying this test for corporate 
waste that eventually produced change.124 So useless was waste 
as a limit to fees that in 1969 Congress amended the Investment 
                                                                                                     
had been ratified by shareholders and by unaffiliated directors, the plaintiffs 
had to bear the burden of proving affirmatively that the fees were so grossly 
excessive that payment thereof constituted a waste of corporate asset.”). 
 119. H.R. REP. NO. 89-2337 at 83. 
 120. See Ben L. Fernandez, The Duties of Mutual Fund Independent 
Trustees with Respect to the Investment Advisory Fee, BOS. B.J., Mar.–Apr. 1997, 
at 13 (1997) (“In connection with the analysis of economies of scale, the relevant 
question is whether ‘the per unit cost of performing fund transactions increased 
as the number of transactions increased.’”). 
 121. 184 A.2d 602 (Del. Ch. 1962). 
 122. Id. at 610. 
 123. Mutual Fund Legislation of 1967: Hearings on S. 1659 Before the S. 
Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong. 1015 (1967) (statement of Judge 
Henry J. Friendly); see, e.g., Mark S. Vander Broek, Comment: The Demand 
Requirement in Investment Company Act Shareholder Actions, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1500, 1504–05 (1983) (“The unaffiliated directors appeared unable to prevent 
excessive advisory fees, and plaintiff shareholders seeking to attack the fees in 
court were consistently defeated by the existing ICA standard that required 
them to prove that payment of the fees amounted to ‘corporate waste.’”). 
 124. See id. at 1505 (“In an attempt to control excessive advisory fees, 
Congress amended the ICA in 1970.”). 
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Company Act to include a new Section 36(b) imposing fiduciary 
duties on advisers in relation to fees—effectively taking the issue 
away from state courts and state corporate law doctrine.125 
Waste would be largely quiescent in the core areas of 
corporate law for the next two decades. Before jumping ahead to 
later developments, though, we turn briefly to examine waste’s 
role in two other areas of corporate expenditures, charitable gifts 
and political donations. 
B. Charitable Gifts 
Under ultra vires, gifts in general were forbidden, and the 
classic example of such a forbidden gift was a gift to charity. 126 A 
leading English case spoke the rule: “Charity has no business to 
sit at boards of directors qua charity.”127 While there was a small 
space for donations that promised to redound to the corporation’s 
immediate or short-term benefit, such gifts were allowed 
precisely because they were not true gifts.128 This rule was 
                                                                                                     
 125. See COMM. ON INTERSTATE FOREIGN COMMERCE, REPORT OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF 
INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. NO. 89-2337, at 135 (1966) (Conf. 
Rep.); SELIGMAN, supra note 116, at 378–80. Whatever hopes for it, in the end 
Section 36(b) did no better for investors than did the waste doctrine. Lyman 
Johnson, Protecting Mutual Fund Investors: An Inevitable Eclecticism, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MUTUAL FUNDS (William Birdthistle & John Morley, 
eds. 2016) (explaining that no investor has ever won a claim under Section 
36(b)). 
 126. See FLETCHER ON CORPORATIONS, supra note 30, at 2148–49 (“[T]here is 
no question but that an ordinary business corporation is without power to give 
away part of its property” in the form of “a mere gift, such as a gift to charity”). 
 127. BALLANTINE 1946, supra note 93, at 228 (quoting Hutton v. West Cork 
Ry. Co. [1883], 23 Ch. Div. 654, 673 (C.A.)). 
 128. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) 
(indicating that “incidental humanitarian expenditures of corporate funds for 
the benefit of the employees” would be allowable); Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 
40 N.Y.S. 718 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1896) (“If that act is . . . lawful in itself, . . . is done 
for the purpose of serving corporate ends, and is reasonably tributary to the 
promotion of those ends, in a substantial, and not in a remote and fanciful, 
sense, it may fairly be considered within charter powers.”); see also Note, 
Donations by a Business Corporation as Intra Vires, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 136, 136 
(1931) (“Gifts by business corporations, organized for profit, are ordinarily ultra 
vires. But donations are made with the expectation that pecuniary benefits to 
the corporation will result.”). 
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weakened in the 1930s as several states adopted statutes 
specifically allowing corporate charitable donations without 
requiring recognizable benefit to the corporation, probably in 
response to immiseration and anti-corporate sentiment during 
the Great Depression.129  
Even with this change, though, charitable donations were not 
automatically allowed, and fear lingered that such donations 
would be found ultra vires.130 This was partially overcome in the 
well-known 1953 case of A.P. Smith Manufacturing v. Barlow,131 
where the New Jersey Supreme Court held a corporate charitable 
donation to Princeton University intra vires under the common 
law of corporations.132 The court reasoned that the donation, 
while not providing immediate benefits to Smith Manufacturing, 
would still eventually advance the interests of the company as 
well as the community—a widely followed holding that allowed 
corporate donations largely to occur without fear of ultra vires.133 
Yet there was an important caveat; while the case apparently 
rested on the common law, the court also looked to New Jersey’s 
statute, which allowed only “reasonable” donations—defined as 
                                                                                                     
 129. See Note, Corporations—Charities—Statute Making Contributions to 
Charity by Corporations Intra Vires, 52 HARV. L. REV. 538, 538–39 (1939) 
(listing statutes adopted over the previous decade allowing corporate charitable 
donations). See generally Ray Garrett, Corporate Donations to Charity, 4 BUS. 
LAW. 28 (1948) (citing different surveys to give an idea of corporate donations to 
charities at the time). 
 130. See Garrett, supra note 129, at 28 (“It was the traditional rule that a 
donation of its property by a corporation not created for charitable purposes was 
ultra vires and in violation of the rights of the stockholders.”). 
 131. 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953). 
 132. See id. at 590 (“There is no suggestion that it was made 
indiscriminately or to a pet charity of the corporate directors in furtherance of 
personal rather than corporate ends.”). New Jersey did have a statute allowing 
charitable donations, but the statute arguably did not apply to the company 
here because it was passed long after the company’s incorporation. See id. (“We 
find that it was a lawful exercise of the corporation’s implied and incidental 
powers under common-law principles and that it came within the express 
authority of the pertinent state legislation.”). 
 133. See id. (“[I]t was made to a preeminent institution of higher 
learning . . . and was voluntarily made in the reasonable belief that it would aid 
the public welfare and advance the interests of the plaintiff as a private 
corporation and as part of the community in which it operates.”). The court also 
warned that donations could not be to “pet charities,” a signal that the duty of 
loyalty would still apply to decisions to give charitable donations. Id. 
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less than 5% of capital and surplus—to place a limit on the size of 
a donation.134 
How such a reasonableness limit was applied is shown in 
1969’s Theodora Holding Corp. v Henderson,135 where the 
Delaware Supreme Court upheld a $528,000 charitable 
donation.136 The grounds for the challenge were not entirely clear; 
while the plaintiff claimed the donation was a violation of the 
controlling shareholder’s fiduciary duties, the court appeared to 
ask whether the donation was ultra vires.137 After noting that 
Delaware’s statute gave corporations power to make charitable 
donations and, unlike New Jersey’s statute, put no limits on the 
donation’s size, the court still concluded that “the test to be 
applied in passing on the validity of a gift such . . . is that of 
reasonableness” and pointed to federal tax law’s deduction 
limitation of 5% of income as a measure of reasonableness.138 The 
gift fell below this 5% limit, and the court also found this would 
end up “benefiting plaintiff in the long run.”139 Twenty years later 
in Kahn v Sullivan,140 Delaware’s Supreme Court would make 
clear that Theodora dealt with a corporate waste claim when it 
affirmed the approval of a settlement over another corporate 
charitable donation: that of Occidental Petroleum for a museum 
named after the firm’s founder, Armand Hammer.141 It held that 
the test for waste—at least in the charitable context—was 
Theodora’s test of reasonableness, with IRS provisions again “a 
helpful guide.”142  
                                                                                                     
 134. See id. at 587 (“[T]he contribution shall not exceed [5]% [o]f capital and 
surplus unless the excess is authorized by the stockholders at a regular or 
special meeting.”). 
 135. 257 A.2d 398 (Del. 1969). 
 136. Id. at 401. 
 137. See id. at 404–05 (inquiring into the reasonableness of the charitable 
donation). 
 138. Id. at 405. The limit is now 10%. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(2)(A) (2012) (“The 
total deductions under subsection (a) for any taxable year (other than for 
contributions to which subparagraph (B) or (C) applies) shall not exceed 10 
percent of the taxpayer’s taxable income.”). 
 139. Theodora Holding, 257 A.2d at 405. 
 140. 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991). 
 141. See id. at 63 (“In this case, we find that all of the Court of Chancery’s 
factual findings of fact are supported by the record.”). 
 142. Id. at 61. 
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In corporate charitable giving we see once more the strictures 
of ultra vires transform into the weaker and more rarely invoked 
ban on waste. Certainly, some of this is due to broadening views 
of corporate purpose and a more capacious approach to how a 
donation could eventually benefit a corporation. By the 1950s, 
gifts were allowed not only for the corporation’s immediate 
benefit but to benefit the free enterprise system in which 
corporations flourished.143 Yet the shadow of corporate waste still 
hangs over this jurisprudence, in the rule that charitable 
donations be “reasonable” and the use of the IRS deductible limit 
as a rough measure of that.144 Corporate decisions to give 
charitable gifts still occur under a more watchful judicial eye 
than do other corporate acts. 
C. Political Donations 
As with charitable gifts, there was little question at the 
beginning of the twentieth century that corporate donations to 
politicians and political campaigns were ultra vires.145 Whatever 
                                                                                                     
 143. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (demonstrating a case where 
a corporation made a charitable donation to Princeton University in order to 
benefit the community). 
 144. The requirement that donations be “reasonable” is not to be found in 
either Delaware’s corporate statute nor the Model Business Corporation Act.  
 145. See, e.g., Mobile Gas Co. v. Patterson, 293 F. 208, 226 (M.D. Ala. 1923) 
(finding contributions to political campaigns not a legitimate corporate expense); 
McConnell v. Combination Min. & Mill. Co., 76 P. 194, 199 (Mont. 1904) (“The 
donation to Louis S. McClure and to the Bimetallic Mining Company were 
clearly outside of the purposes for which the corporation was created, both being 
for strictly political purposes.”); see also Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: 
Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Laws, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 
915–17 (2004) (“The noted political reformer Perry Belmont contended that 
corporate law held the promise of at least a partial remedy for owners of all 
types of corporations offended by the use of their money for campaign 
contributions.” (quotation at 915)); Daniel Lipton, Note, Corporate Capacity for 
Crimes and Politics: Defining Corporate Personhood at the Turn of the Twentieth 
Century, 96 VA. L. REV. 1911, 1919–24 (2011) (“Courts considered corporate 
political expenditures to be ultra vires before lawmakers outlawed political uses 
of corporate funds.” (quotation at 1919)). Many states in the early twentieth 
century also banned corporate political contributions through legislation. See id. 
at 1923 (“[T]he wave of legislation reinforcing the ultra vires doctrine against 
corporate political expenditures was also motivated by a perceived public 
interest.”). 
CORPORATE WASTE 1265 
a corporation’s specific purposes, advancing political causes was 
not among them.146 When in 1906 it was discovered that the New 
York Life Insurance Company had donated $50,000 to the 
Republican National Committee, New York’s Court of Appeals 
had no problem in holding that the company “had not the right, 
under its law of existence, to agree to make contributions for 
political campaigns, any more than to agree to do other things 
foreign to its charter.”147 A New York investigation of corruption 
in the life insurance industry that year urged that the law be 
changed so that “[n]ot only should [a political contribution] be 
expressly prohibited and treated as a waste of corporate moneys,” 
but any agent making a donation for a corporation should be 
guilty of a misdemeanor.148 There was, as usual, a caveat to this 
rule—some authorities suggested that a corporation could donate 
funds to defeat a cause deemed “inimical to its interests”—but the 
idea that corporations largely lacked the power to make political 
donations undergirded many of the first campaign-finance laws 
adopted early in the twentieth century, including the United 
States’ first national campaign finance law, the Tillman Act.149 
                                                                                                     
 146. See Lipton, supra note 145, at 1919 (“The ultra vires nature of such 
expenditures, however, did not derive from an abstract philosophy of corporate 
personhood, but instead stemmed from the scope of corporate purpose 
authorized by the shareholders.”). 
 147. People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, 80 N.E. 383, 387 (N.Y. 1907). The case 
was actually about whether George W. Perkins, the New York Life executive 
who arranged the donation, could be tried for larceny for taking the company’s 
money and giving it to the committee; the court held in a divided opinion that he 
could not, but only because he lacked the intent necessary to have committed 
the crime. See id. (“The essential element of the ‘intent to deprive and defraud’ 
is nowhere to be found, and there is no just basis for the inference.”); see also 
JOHN A. GARRATY, RIGHT-HAND MAN, THE LIFE OF GEORGE W. PERKINS 190–93 
(New York: Harper & Bros., 1957). 
 148. Winkler, supra note 145, at 918 (quoting STATE OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE 
JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE AND ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE THE AFFAIRS OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES, Assemb. 
Doc. No. 41, 106 (1906)). 
 149. Id. at 916 (quoting ARTHUR W. MACHEN, JR., A TREATISE ON THE MODERN 
LAW OF CORPORATIONS 87–88 (1908)); see also Victor Brudney, Business 
Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 
235, 235 (1981) [hereinafter Brudney, Business Corporations] (“By the beginning 
of this century, public pressure resulted in regulatory restrictions on corporate 
political expenditures even if authority for such expenditures could be found 
within corporate charters.”); Note, Corporate Political Affairs Programs, 70 
YALE L.J. 821, 837 (1961) (providing an example of a typical state statute 
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While most of the cases labeling political donations ultra 
vires were from early in the twentieth century, this is another 
area where the idea that some expenditures were ultra vires 
lingered. Here too, however, as the belief that a corporation was 
circumscribed by a limited purpose faded, so did the notion that 
all political donations, irrespective of purpose, were ultra vires. In 
Abrams v. Allen,150 a 1947 New York case, the court held that use 
of corporate assets to promote an official’s personal views could 
“state a cause of action for waste, mismanagement, lack of due 
care, or conversion”;151 but in making these claims, plaintiffs were 
careful to claim that the expenditures were not actuated by 
“honest bona fide considerations affecting the welfare” of the 
corporation.152 As states changed their legislation to allow some 
corporate political expenditures, many still banned donations not 
directly tied to the corporation’s business. The Massachusetts 
campaign finance law eventually struck down by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,153 for 
example, only prohibited corporations from making expenditures 
to influence a vote “other than [on] questions materially affecting 
the property, business, or assets of the corporation.”154 In other 
words, it was contributions that would return no benefit to the 
corporation that the statute barred: those constituting waste. In a 
1981 article reviewing the Court’s political speech jurisprudence, 
Victor Brudney argued, in a section headed Ultra Vires Speech: 
                                                                                                     
prohibiting corporations from contributing to political campaigns). 
 150. 74 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1947). 
151. Corporate Political Affairs Programs, supra note 149, at 844. 
 152. Abrams, 74 N.E.2d at 305; see also Corporate Political Affairs 
Programs, supra note 149, at 824–27 (detailing corporate expenditures 
promoting particular views). Some thirty years later, a similar claim also 
appeared in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), where plaintiffs alleged a 
corporation’s political donations were illegal and, thus, ultra vires under 
Delaware law. Id. at 72 n.6 (“[T]here is not properly before us respondent’s 
argument that the acts of a Delaware corporation violative of United States 
criminal statutes are ultra vires acts under Delaware corporation law.”). Illegal 
donations may also violate a director’s fiduciary duties, irrespective of whether 
or not the corporation benefits. See Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 
1974) (“[E]ven though committed to benefit the corporation, illegal acts may 
amount to a breach of fiduciary duty in New York.”). 
 153. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 154. Id. at 765. 
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Waste, that the power remained for a state to ban certain kinds of 
corporate speech by requiring unanimous shareholder approval of 
the expenditure (as is required under classic doctrine for approval 
of any wasteful expenditure).155 
As corporate political donations became increasingly 
regulated by state and federal legislation, waste claims against 
corporate political expenditures tapered off, though they did not 
disappear. During the 1990s, in Stern v. General Electric,156 the 
plaintiff in a series of cases alleged that General Electric’s 
donations to its political action committee were wasteful. The 
claim was subsequently thrown out by a court operating under 
New York’s distinctive definition of waste, which required bad 
intent and that there be “a transaction no person of ordinary 
sound business judgment” would have judged the corporation 
received “fair benefit” for.157 Today, in the wake of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC,158 scholars 
are again quarrying the waste doctrine to see if it could provide 
any limit on a corporation’s political expenditures.159  
IV. Waste’s Work 
A. Waste’s Frustrations 
From the 1960s into the 1980s, waste as a doctrine was at a 
low ebb.160 This is probably because executive compensation was 
                                                                                                     
 155. See Brudney, Business Corporations, supra note 149, at 243–52 (“To 
start with the least complicated configuration, let us assume that state common 
law or statutory law forbids waste by corporate management, and that it defines 
waste as expenditures from which the enterprise cannot reasonably be expected 
to benefit.”). 
 156. 837 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 157. Id. at 76. 
 158. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 159. See, e.g., Leahy, Super PAC, supra note 11, at 290 (“As such, this article 
undertakes a detailed inquiry into the theories—waste and self-dealing—that 
these authors propose that shareholders could use to successfully challenge a 
corporate political contribution.”); Nelson II, Post-Citizens United, supra note 
11, at 144–45 (“Shareholders may file derivative claims of corporate waste 
against directors of corporations to challenge corporate independent political 
expenditures that they believe are detrimental to the corporation.”). 
 160. This is not to say there were no cases asserting waste. See, e.g., Kelly v. 
Bell, 254 A.2d 62, 74 (Del. Ch. 1969) (rejecting an assertion that a corporation’s 
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not a significant issue for much of that period, and the line of 
cases stemming from Rogers v. Hill161 was seen as chiefly 
applying to executive compensation.162 When courts did address 
compensation, they more often looked at the process used to set 
it, not whether the resulting pay package constituted waste.163 It 
was also at this time that statutory reforms swept away what 
little was left of ultra vires. In 1950, the Model Business 
Corporation Act (MBCA) eliminated ultra vires claims except in 
very limited circumstances, making plain what had already 
occurred in judicial decisions.164 In 1967, Delaware followed suit 
in the revised Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), 
“severely constrict[ing] the categories of claimants who [could] 
raise the ultra vires defense.”165 These changes illuminate not 
only the dwindling of ultra vires, but how waste had become 
detached from its predecessor. By the end of the 1970s we begin 
to see cases refer to acts that could be waste or ultra vires, a 
distinction emphasizing the separation of the two.166 A prime 
illustration of this divergence appeared when the American Law 
Institute adopted its controversial Principles of Corporate 
                                                                                                     
voluntary payment in lieu of taxes was waste). 
 161. 289 U.S. 582 (1933). 
 162. See CLARK, supra note 85, at 197–99 (treating Rogers as solely a case 
about executive compensation); Detlev Vagts, Challenges to Executive 
Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231, 232 (1983) 
(identifying the growing concerns of over-generous management compensation). 
 163. See Vagts, supra note 162, at 268 (“Rather than attack the 
compensation problem head-on, the courts have focused on what was done 
inside the corporations by the board of directors, by committees, and by the 
shareholders.”). 
 164. MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 6 (1950); see also Whitney 
Campbell, The Modern Business Corporation Act, 11 BUS. LAW. 98, 102 (1956) 
(“[S]ection 6 of the model act . . . abolishes the . . . ultra-vires [doctrine], while 
preserving the doctrine to a very limited degree.”). 
 165. 1 ERNEST L. FOLK, III, RODMAN WARD, JR. & EDWARD P. WELCH, FOLK ON 
THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATE LAW 2-21 to 2-24 (2015); see also DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8 § 124 (2017) (limiting ultra vires); Casanaro v. Bloodhound Techs., 65 
A.3d 618, 648–54 (Del. Ch. 2013) (discussing Section 124 and ultra vires in 
Delaware law). 
 166. See Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 218–19 (Del. 1979) (noting that 
voidable acts are those that are “performed in the interest of the corporation but 
beyond” management authority, in contrast “from acts which are ultra 
vires . . . or waste of corporate assets”). This is not to say that the link between 
waste and ultra vires was completely forgotten, just that the two concepts were 
increasingly not seen as the same thing. Id. 
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Governance,167 which briefly discussed—and largely dismissed—
the “common law doctrine of ultra vires” in one section, while 
devoting a separate section to waste in which ultra vires was not 
mentioned—treating them as two separate concepts.168  
Waste claims had at least one troublesome aspect, though, 
that made the doctrine difficult to completely ignore: they could 
be tough to get rid of, at least in Delaware—home of the majority 
of the nation’s giant corporations. At first glance, they should not 
have been. Waste claims were on their face implausible (a 
transaction no rational business person would make, at least 
absent fiduciary duty violations?), and no court after mid-century 
found a transaction wasteful in a final judgment.169 But unlike 
with some fiduciary duty claims, there was no straightforward 
procedure to eliminate a waste claim—in particular, mere 
majority ratification by shareholders did not immediately 
extinguish a waste claim,170 a rule best explained as a survival of 
the principle that void acts such as ultra vires could only be 
ratified by unanimous shareholder vote.171  
Nor was it always easy for courts to dismiss waste claims in 
the early stages of litigation.172 Most notably, waste claims 
survived summary judgment motions more often than one would 
                                                                                                     
 167. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (AM. LAW INST. 1994). 
 168. Compare id. § 2.01 (referencing the “common law doctrine of ultra 
vires”), with id. § 1.42 (discussing “waste of corporate assets” with no reference 
to ultra vires). 
 169. See Jack B. Jacobs, Fifty Years of Corporate Law Evolution: A Delaware 
Judge’s Retrospective, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 141, 155 (2015) (stating corporate 
waste as “an event never proved in any case I am aware of”). 
 170. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (“In all 
events, informed, uncoerced, disinterested shareholder ratification of a 
transaction in which corporate directors have a material conflict of interest has 
the effect of protecting the transaction from judicial review except on the basis 
of waste.”).  
 171. The most sensible explanation for this rule is that unanimous 
ratification is “akin to universal acquiescence by all possible stockholder 
plaintiffs. The act remains void, but there is no one left to challenge it.” Laster, 
supra note 33, at 1457 n.51. 
 172. It should be noted that the waste claims examined here were almost all 
derivative, and survived motions to dismiss for lack of demand on the basis of 
the second prong of Aronson v. Lewis, which requires plaintiffs to plead 
particularized facts sufficient to create a reasonable doubt that the challenged 
transactions were otherwise the product of a valid business judgment. 473 A.2d 
805, 814–15 (Del. 1984). 
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expect, in good part due to their fact-specific nature. According to 
the Delaware Supreme Court in 1979’s Michelson v. Duncan,173 
“[c]laims of gift or waste of corporate assets are seldom subject to 
disposition by summary judgment; and when there are genuine 
issues of fact as to the existence of consideration, a full hearing is 
required regardless of shareholder ratification.”174 It dated this 
approach back to the stock option cases, which it believed 
“indicate[d] a strong disfavor for summary judgment . . . where 
waste of corporate assets [was] alleged.”175 In one later case, the 
court quoted this passage from Michelson in justifying a refusal 
to grant summary judgment, even while stating that the 
“plaintiffs’ claim of waste [was] barely supported by the 
record.”176 This is not to say that waste claims always survived 
summary judgment, only that they did so more than one would 
expect considering the stringency of the waste test.177 Later 
empirical studies lend support to this conclusion.178 
The ability of some waste claims to survive summary 
judgment, while troublesome for defendants, may not have been 
perceived by others as a problem at all. It has already been 
suggested that one of waste’s functions was as a tool for courts to 
authorize detailed inquiry into dubious corporate transactions 
that were not, on their surface, blatant violations of fiduciary 
duties. If that is the case, then the waste claims that survived 
summary judgment were doing useful work, empowering 
plaintiffs to investigate shady deals and, maybe, warning 
corporate managers against particularly ill-thought or senseless 
                                                                                                     
 173. 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979). 
 174. Id. at 223 (citing Kerbs v. Cal. E. Airways, 90 A.2d 652 (Del. 1952) and 
Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660 (Del. 1952)). 
 175. Id.  
 176. Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 27 (Del. Ch. 1982). 
 177. See Orban v. Field, No. 12820, 1997 WL 153831, at *10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 
1997) (“Although a determination of whether a payment constitutes waste is an 
inherently factual inquiry which is difficult to determine on a summary 
judgment motion, there are some cases in which a set of facts, if true, may be 
said as a matter of law not to constitute waste.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 178. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 5, at 573–85 (documenting survival 
of waste claims at some stages of litigation). The success of waste claims may 
change over time; a later review found that, between 2000 and 2014, ten out of 
fifty-two Delaware cases asserting waste survived summary judgment. Gass, 
supra note 11, at 104. 
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transactions. Be that as it may, by the 1990s Delaware’s courts 
were criticizing the doctrine, perhaps because of a new wave of 
litigation produced by rapidly rising executive compensation,179 or 
because of the difficulty of harmonizing the waste doctrine with 
Delaware’s fiduciary framework.180 Whatever the reason, by the 
mid-1990s Delaware’s courts were expressing frustration with 
waste’s persistence and even doubts about its existence.181 
An initial burst of criticism came in 1995’s Steiner v. 
Meyerson,182 where Chancellor Allen highlighted the bizarre 
qualities of a waste claim in the course of a shareholder challenge 
to executive compensation.183 Waste, he noted, is said to occur 
when “a corporation is caused to effect a transaction on terms 
that no person of ordinary, sound business judgment could 
conclude represent a fair exchange,”184 or in the more extreme 
phrasing of Saxe when there is a transaction so one-sided that no 
person of ordinary, sound business judgment could even 
“entertain the view that [it] represented a fair exchange.”185 
Invoking the doctrine asked a court to pass on a transaction’s 
fairness, contradicting the usual rule that “[a]bsent an allegation 
of fraud or conflict of interest courts will not review the substance 
of corporate contracts.”186 All this for a doctrine that was at best a 
                                                                                                     
 179. One source found that between July 1, 1989, and December 31, 1991, 
Delaware’s Court of Chancery reviewed ninety-eight proposed settlements in 
class or derivative litigation, one-third of which alleged excessive compensation 
or corporate waste. Susan Lorde Martin, The Executive Compensation Problem, 
98 DICK. L. REV. 237, 244 (1994). 
 180. See John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, “Good Faith” and the Ability of 
Directors to Assert § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law as a 
Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches 
of Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111, 117 (2004) (comparing the waste 
doctrine to Delaware’s implementation of exculpation provisions). 
 181. See Steiner v. Meyerson, No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *1 (Del. Ch. 
July 19, 1995) (“The very high hurdle that a shareholder must overcome if he 
seeks to impose liability on a theory of corporate waste is, thus, in fact a 
protection of one of the basic utilities that the corporate form offers.”). 
 182. Id. 
 183. See id. (“This action challenges as corporate waste and breach of 
fiduciary duty certain contractual arrangements through which Telxon 
Corporation compensates its senior officers and its directors.”). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. (quoting Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962). 
 186. Id. at *5. 
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“theoretical exception to [that] statement very rarely encountered 
in the world of real transactions.”187 Lest one be in any doubt 
about his view of the doctrine, he observed that “rarest of all—
and indeed, like Nessie possibly non-existent—would be the case 
of disinterested business people making non-fraudulent deals 
(non-negligently) that meet the legal standard of waste!”188 In 
sum, waste was not only an inconvenient doctrine; it might 
describe only nonexistent transactions. 
With newly voiced doubts about the existence of waste came 
more restrictive approaches to it.189 In Lewis v. Vogelstein,190 
decided two years after Meyerson, Chancellor Allen faced a 
familiar claim: that stock option grants were wasteful.191 The 
opinion restated the standard definition: “waste entails an 
exchange of corporate assets for consideration so 
disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range at which any 
reasonable person might be willing to trade,” typically a gift or 
exchange that serves “no corporate purpose.”192 The court then, 
                                                                                                     
 187. Id.; see also Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 (Del. 
Ch. 1996) (referring, apparently, to waste when discussing a “theoretical 
exception” to the general rule that “in the absence of facts showing self-dealing 
or improper motive, a corporate officer or director is not legally responsible to 
the corporation for losses . . . as a result of a decision . . . in good faith”). 
 188. Steiner v. Meyerson, No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 
19, 1995). 
 189. See Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384, 387–88 (Del. Ch. 1997) 
(concluding that a multimillion dollar stock option grant given a CEO eligible to 
retire immediately was not waste). 
 190. 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997). 
 191. See id. at 329 (“[I]t is asserted that the grants of options actually made 
under the 1996 Plan did not offer reasonable assurance to the corporation that it 
would receive adequate value in exchange for such grants, and that such grants 
represent excessively large compensation for the directors . . . .”). 
 192. Id. at 336. Determining whether an expenditure was for “no corporate 
purpose” raises intriguing theoretical questions in light of recent developments, 
specifically the insistence in one recent decision that a corporate purpose must 
be linked to promoting “the value of the corporation for the benefit of its 
shareholders.” Ebay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. 
Ch. 2010). In the few waste cases that address the question of whether an act 
was for a “corporate purpose,” however, the questioned purpose is usually a 
variant of self-dealing. See Chrysogelos v. London, No. 11910, 1992 WL 58516, 
at *9 (Del. Ch. Mar. 25, 1992) (allowing a waste claim to proceed when the 
challenged expenditure was a share repurchase allegedly intended to entrench 
the board). But see, Gorbow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del. 1988) (rejecting the 
claim that “buying the silence of a dissident within management constitute[d] 
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however, retreated from the approach set out in the 1950’s cases, 
which promised special scrutiny for stock options.193 In Kerbs and 
Gottlieb, the Chancellor concluded, the test applied had not been 
a test for waste at all but instead a form of heightened scrutiny 
no longer required: 
In this age in which institutional shareholders have grown 
strong and can more easily communicate . . . [shareholder 
ratification is] a more rational means to monitor compensation 
than judicial determinations of the ‘fairness’ or sufficiency of 
consideration, which seems a useful technique principally to 
those unfamiliar with the limitations of courts and their 
litigation processes.194  
Going forward, the test to be applied to ratified stock option plans 
would be the “classic test” for waste “(i.e., no consideration; gift; 
no person of ordinary prudence could possibly agree, etc.).”195 
Having discarded the sweeping approach of the earlier stock 
option cases, however, the court was still snared in precedent, 
making it difficult to dismiss a waste claim.196 An “allegation[] 
that an arm’s-length corporate transaction constitutes a waste of 
assets . . . is inherently factual and not easily amenable to 
determination on a motion to dismiss and indeed often not on a 
motion for summary judgment.”197 The waste claim in Vogelstein 
survived the motion to dismiss.198 
The capstone to the Delaware courts’ increasingly skeptical 
approach to waste was 1999’s Harbor Finance Partners v. 
                                                                                                     
an invalid business purpose” and was therefore waste); see also Lyman Johnson 
& David Millon, Corporate Law after Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 22 
(2014/2015) (noting that unless corporations are free to pursue non-pecuniary 
ends, all corporate social responsibility is ultra vires). 
 193. See Lewis, 699 A.2d at 337 (discussing that the stock option cases were 
“very problematic”). Or so it claimed. See Lori B. Marino, Executive 
Compensation and the Misplaced Emphasis on Increasing Shareholder Access to 
the Proxy, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1205, 1242–44 (1999) (providing a skeptical read of 
Lewis’s reading of the 1950’s stock options cases). 
 194. Lewis, 699 A.2d at 338. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See id. at 338–39 (discussing the precedent of waste claims and its 
analysis pursuant to “[t]he standard for determination of motions to dismiss”). 
 197. Id. at 339. 
 198. Id.  
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Huizenga,199 in which stockholder plaintiffs challenged a 
merger.200 Then Vice-Chancellor Strine’s opinion posed a 
question, which must have occurred to many thoughtful 
observers: why could a waste claim not be extinguished by 
ratification from a majority of informed disinterested 
shareholders?201 Shouldn’t such ratification by definition signal 
that this was a transaction on which reasonable businesspersons 
could differ, and so not meet the test for waste? While the rule 
not permitting shareholder ratification was a “seemingly sensible 
doctrine,” he wrote, its “actual application has no apparent 
modern day utility . . . except as an opportunity for Delaware 
courts to second-guess stockholders.”202 Transactions attacked as 
waste in Delaware courts were typically “garden variety 
transactions that may be validly accomplished by a Delaware 
corporation if supported by sufficient consideration,” ranging 
from stock option plans to corporate mergers.203 Waste did not, in 
his account, protect stockholders where there had been 
ratification.204 If “fully informed, uncoerced, independent 
stockholders have approved the transaction, they have, it seems 
to me, made the decision that the transaction is a ‘fair 
exchange.’”205 In closing, while the opinion acknowledged that 
there may be “valid reasons for [waste’s] continuation,” it called 
for those reasons to be “articulated and weighed against the costs 
the vestige imposes on stockholders and the judicial system. 
Otherwise, inertia alone may perpetuate an outdated rule 
fashioned in a very different time.”206 Though none of these cases 
called for waste’s complete abolition, each expressed deep doubts 
about waste as presently constituted. An observer in 1999 would 
                                                                                                     
 199. 751 A.2d 879 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
 200. See id. at 881 (“This matter involves a challenge to the acquisition of 
AutoNation, Incorporated by Republic Industries, Inc.”). 
 201. See id. at 895 (stating that he questions the “continued utility” of such 
extinguishment of a claim once it has been ratified by the shareholders). 
 202. Id. at 896–97. 
 203. Id. at 897. 
 204. See id. at 898 (stating that disinterested stockholders should be given 
leeway with “little reason to leave the door open for a judicial reconsideration of 
the matter” if they “are given the information necessary to decide”). 
 205. Id. at 901. 
 206. Id. at 902. 
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have been entirely justified in assuming the doctrine was about to 
be further marginalized. That observer would have been wrong. 
B. Waste’s Uses 
While waste came under fire in the 1990s, its utility in 
corporate law had not completely disappeared, as shown by two of 
the major cases in the following decade, In re Walt Disney 
Company Derivative Litigation207 and In re Citigroup Inc. 
Shareholder Derivative Litigation.208 The role it would play was 
summed up in Sample v. Morgan,209 a case where shareholders 
challenged a stock incentive plan that provided three corporate 
insiders with a significant ownership stake in their firm in 
exchange for $200.210 “When pled facts support an inference of 
waste,” the opinion explained, “judicial nostrils smell something 
fishy and full discovery into the background of the transaction is 
permitted. In the end, most transactions that actually involve 
waste are almost found to have been inspired by some form of 
conflicting self-interest.”211 Waste “allows a plaintiff to pass go at 
the complaint stage even when the motivations for a transaction 
are unclear by pointing to economic terms so one-sided as to 
create an inference that no person acting in good faith pursuit of 
the corporation’s interests could have approved the terms.”212 The 
opinion then articulated waste’s role as a safety valve allowing 
further scrutiny of transactions that were not on their surface 
fiduciary duty violations, but were inexplicable otherwise.213 
                                                                                                     
 207. 906 A.2d 27, 75 (Del. 2006).  
 208. See 964 A.2d 106, 112 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“The motion to dismiss is denied 
as to the claim in Count III for waste . . . .”). 
 209. 914 A.2d 647 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 210. See id. at 650–53 (“[G]iving away nearly a third of the voting and cash 
flow rights of [the] company . . . .” (quotation at 652)). 
 211. Id. at 670. Query whether this should read “almost always.” Accord In 
re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 657 (Del. Ch. 2008) (stating that 
waste is a “rigorous test designed to smoke out shady, bad faith deals”); see also 
STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 128 (3d ed. 2015) (“[I]nquiry into the 
rationality of a decision is a proxy for an inquiry into whether the decision was 
tainted by self-interest”). 
 212. Sample, 914 A.2d at 670. 
 213. See id. at 669 (“[T]he doctrine of waste is a residual protection for 
stockholders that polices the outer boundaries of the broad field of discretion 
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Waste worked this way in Disney, where shareholders 
challenged the Disney board’s decisions to hire, then fire, Michael 
Ovitz as the firm’s number-two officer and to pay him generous 
termination benefits ($130 million after roughly a year’s work).214 
Among other claims, plaintiffs alleged that the board could have 
dismissed Ovitz for cause and paid him nothing upon 
termination, therefore making the large payment he did receive a 
gift.215 While the chancery court initially dismissed the claims, 
the Delaware Supreme Court’s reversal (in part) of this decision 
ultimately produced a bench trial in which, before Disney won, its 
board’s decision to grant Ovitz’s compensation was raked over the 
coals—providing a case study in how Delaware courts could, 
when they chose, use waste as an opening for rigorous critique of 
board decision-making procedures.216  
Disney showed waste being used as a tool to enable 
investigation and identify proper corporate procedures, but also 
something more. In Disney and later Citigroup, waste also gave 
courts a means to demonstrate publicly that they were aware of 
and responsive to larger social and political developments. In the 
case of Disney, the larger development was rising executive 
compensation and calls for limits on it.217 Compensation became a 
major issue in the 1990s, with the Federal Government 
intervening to curb its growth in 1993 and threatening to do so 
                                                                                                     
afforded directors by the business judgment rule.”). 
 214. Three decisions were important: The Delaware Supreme Court’s 
affirming and reversing in part the Chancery’s dismissal of the initial charges, 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 267 (Del. 2000); the subsequent trial court 
decision, In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 778 (Del. Ch. 
2005); and the Supreme Court’s upholding of that decision, In re Walt Disney 
Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 75 (Del. 2006). 
 215. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 265. 
 216. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware 
Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1010–20 (showcasing Delaware 
courts’ use of opinions to set corporate norms); see also Lyman Johnson, 
Counter-Narrative in Corporate Law: Saints, Sinners, Apostles, and Epistles, 
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 847, 851 (2009) (“Unlike the re-tellers of the biblical 
gospel, however, the ‘apostles’ of corporate law—the elite corporate bar—
frequently screen out the moral tone when writing their ‘epistles’ about 
Disney . . . .”). 
 217. See In re Disney, 906 A.2d at 56 (stating that the plaintiffs contend that 
the compensation committee’s approval of Ovitz’s employee agreement resulted 
in an “enormous payout,” upon which the committee did not have adequate 
information regarding the “magnitude” of the amount it could be). 
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for the rest of the decade.218 The Disney case allowed Delaware’s 
courts to broadcast that they took high pay seriously, thereby 
dissuading non-Delaware actors from taking further steps to 
limit high compensation.219 Indeed, in 2002, after the first Disney 
Supreme Court decision and about the time that the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act220 was passed—significantly impinging on state 
corporate law— two distinguished Delaware jurists wrote of the 
need for Delaware courts to address executive compensation more 
closely after many years of a “hands-off approach,” noting that 
one way courts might police such compensation would be through 
a “qualitatively more intense form of judicial review, through, for 
example, a reinvigorated application of the concept of waste.”221 
This did not come to pass, exactly—waste was not “reinvigorated” 
after this case—but it helps explain why waste was deployed the 
way it was in Disney. 222 
Waste would play a similar role in the first major case 
responding to the 2008 financial crisis: Citigroup.223 Citigroup 
was not, initially, primarily a waste case; rather, plaintiffs’ main 
claim was that Citigroup’s directors had ignored a series of “red 
flags” in the lead-up to the crisis, thereby violating their 
oversight duties as spelled out in In re Caremark International 
Inc. Derivative Litigation.224 The court quickly disposed of the 
                                                                                                     
 218. Harwell Wells, U.S. Executive Compensation in Historical Perspective, 
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EXECUTIVE PAY 41, 50–51 (Jennifer G. Hill & 
Randall S. Thomas eds., 2012). 
 219. See Mark Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 643 
(2003) (describing rumblings that, after Sarbanes–Oxley, Delaware “could 
attack excessive executive pay”). 
 220. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101, 116 Stat. 745, 
750 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2012)). 
 221. William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the 
American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two 
Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 1001 (2003). 
 222. See Roe, supra note 219, at 643 n.211 (discussing that the possible 
decision by the Delaware Supreme Court in Disney was either due to the 
promulgation of Sarbanes–Oxley or “the state’s direct perception of the 
underlying corporate problems”). 
 223. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 111 (Del. 
Ch. 2009). 
 224. See id. at 121 (claiming that the financial markets displayed 
“worsening conditions” that reflected Citigroup’s vulnerability to “exposure,” 
and due to the director’s lack of oversight they were liable under the standard 
set out in Caremark). 
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oversight claims, concluding that there was no serious evidence 
that the directors had disregarded their Caremark 
responsibilities and that the claim was really a “straightforward 
claim of breach of the fiduciary duty of care,” exculpated under 
Citigroup’s charter.225 Yet tacked onto the oversight claim were a 
series of waste claims, and one survived.226 In November 2007, as 
the crisis hit, Citigroup’s board had agreed to provide retiring 
CEO Charles Prince $68 million and fringe benefits in return for 
which Prince would sign a non-compete agreement and certain 
other agreements.227 The Chancellor concluded that the court was 
provided little information about “the real value, if any, of the 
various promises given by Prince” and that “[w]ithout more 
information . . . there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the 
letter agreement meets the admittedly stringent ‘so one sided’ 
standard or whether [it] awarded compensation that is beyond 
the ‘outer limit’” of waste.228  
Citigroup arguably fell within the older line of cases in which 
courts more closely, scrutinized payments made to retiring 
executives.229 It was perceived, however, as the product of a 
“political zeitgeist” that had turned against major financial 
institutions and their compensation practices that had done so 
much to produce the crisis.230 Some speculated that the case 
might herald “the beginning of a new era in Delaware business 
jurisprudence.”231 One law firm advised clients that after 
Citigroup, “extra care must be taken with respect to executive 
compensation packages coinciding with decreasing corporate 
                                                                                                     
 225. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 128 n.65. 
 226. See id. at 140 (“Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied as to the claim 
in Count III of the Complaint for waste . . . .”). 
 227. Id. at 139. 
 228. Id. 
 229. See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text (discussing the decisions 
pursuant to payments for past services). But see Joseph W. Cooch, In re 
Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation: In the Heat of Crisis, Chancery 
Court Scrutinizes Executive Compensation, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 169, 186–91 
(2011) (providing an argument that Citigroup departed from earlier decisions). 
 230. See Michael J. Biles & Kimberly G. Davis, Keeping Current: Corporate 
Compensation, BUS. L. TODAY, Sept.–Oct. 2009, at 22, 22 (stating that it was an 
“unusual move from the traditionally pro-business Delaware courts”). 
 231. Id. 
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success,”232 while another warned that “the Citigroup decision is 
likely to leave open a window of opportunity for shareholders to 
bring claims relating to executive compensation and severance 
packages under the doctrine of corporate waste.”233  
Both Disney and Citigroup made it possible to conclude that 
the waste doctrine was being rejuvenated, and would be wielded 
as it briefly had been in the 1930s, as a way for courts to cast a 
harsh light on excessive pay and larger governance failures. 
Standing by itself, Citigroup was an excellent illustration of the 
potentially flexible application of waste and the ways that it could 
focus attention and criticism on board decisions. Yet as the 
financial crisis passed, the wheel turned again. Several later 
cases alleging waste in the granting of executive compensation 
were dismissed, and Citigroup was eventually dismissed “without 
compensation to any plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney.”234 In 
retrospect the case was an outlier. As in earlier iterations, a brief 
period in which it appeared waste might be given expansive 
application was followed by a retreat from the doctrine. 
What role then does waste still have to play? One answer is 
that it no longer has any distinctive role to play and that it is 
already in the process of being folded into Delaware’s framework 
of fiduciary duties as a subset of good faith. 
V. Waste and Good Faith 
Today, there is a strong trend towards treating waste as an 
aspect of the fiduciary duty of good faith. A great deal has been 
written about good faith over the last twenty years, so a brief 
                                                                                                     
 232. HERBERT F. KOZLOV ET AL., IN RE CITIGROUP: DELAWARE COURT OF 
CHANCERY ALLOWS CLAIM FOR CORPORATE WASTE BASED ON EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION TO PROCEED, BUT DISMISSES ‘HINDSIGHT’ FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS, 
REED SMITH 3 (2009), https://www.reedsmith.com/files/Publication/217a3b75-
30a4-40d5-b38b-b6967113eaf8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/119c3ebf-
553c-4453-aa74-2359c58e4fa2/alert09077.pdf.  
 233. Delaware Chancery Court Revisits Oversight Liability and Corporate 
Waste, DUANEMORRIS (Mar. 22, 2009), http://www.duanemorris.com/alerts/alert 
3190.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 234. Christine Hurt, The Duty to Manage Risk, 39 J. CORP. L. 253, 278 
(2014) (citing In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 3338-VCG, 2012 
WL 628347 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2012)). 
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summary will suffice.235 Some variant of “good faith” has been an 
element of fiduciary duties since modern notions of directors’ 
duties began to take shape.236 Statements that fiduciary duties 
included, or had to be carried out with, “good faith” were 
commonplace a century ago.237 But good faith was more often 
invoked than analyzed.238 It drew new attention starting with two 
decisions in the 1990s. In the first, Cede & Co. v. Technicolor 
Inc.,239 the Delaware Supreme Court announced that there was a 
“triad” of fiduciary duties: loyalty, care, and good faith.240 This 
unsettled earlier models of fiduciary duties and attracted 
litigants who saw in good faith a way to avoid exculpatory clauses 
by recasting gross negligence claims as claims of bad faith.241 In 
the second case, In re Caremark, just three years after the 
announcement of the “triad” of fiduciary duties it was suggested 
                                                                                                     
 235. For the most useful recent articles on good faith, see Joseph K. Leahy, 
A Decade After Disney: A Primer on Good and Bad Faith, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 859, 
864 (2015) [hereinafter Leahy, A Decade After Disney]; Strine, Jr. et al., supra 
note 10, at 634; Thompson, supra note 10, at 544. 
 236. See Strine, Jr. et al., supra note 10, at 633 (noting long history of “good 
faith” in Delaware corporation law). 
 237. See MORAWETZ, supra note 39, at 483 (“It is manifest . . . that the 
directors of a corporation occupy a position of the highest trust and confidence, 
and that the utmost good faith is required in the exercise of the power conferred 
upon them.”); see also Lofland v. Cahall, 118 A. 1, 3 (Del. 1922) (“Directors of a 
corporation are trustees for the stockholders, and their acts are governed by the 
rules applicable to such a relation, which exact of them the utmost good faith 
and fair dealing . . . .”); Vance v. Phx. Ins. Co., 72 Tenn. 385, 388 (1880) 
(“Directors of a corporation undoubtedly occupy a fiduciary relation toward the 
stockholders, and are bound to good faith and reasonable diligence in the 
performance of their duties.”).  
 238. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64 (Del. 2006) 
(“[T]he duty to act in good faith is, up to this point relatively uncharted.”). 
 239. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993). 
 240. Id. at 361. 
 241. See Strine, Jr. et al, supra note 10, at 631 (stating that since 
Technicolor, plaintiffs could “subject the directors to damages liability even in 
the absence of improper subjective motivation”). Gross negligence would 
constitute a violation of the duty of care, and the typical corporation has 
amended its charter to exculpate directors for monetary damages for violations 
of that duty as allowed by DGCL section 102(b)(7), but that provision also 
prohibits exculpating “acts or omissions not in good faith.” Id. at 696 (quoting 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)). 
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that good faith was an aspect of the duty of care, further 
confusing the existing fiduciary framework.242 
The initial ambiguity surrounding good faith attracted 
litigants seeking an “independent tool for courts to find liability 
or enjoin activities that [did] not quite fit within established 
doctrinal categories.”243 Good faith, then, was the latest candidate 
for the role of judicial “fail-safe” played by waste and, more 
briefly, “substantive due care.”244 In a series of decisions 
beginning with Disney in 2006, however, Delaware courts 
corralled good faith and placed it within the more familiar dyad 
of fiduciary duties, holding it was an aspect of the duty of loyalty. 
In Disney Delaware’s Supreme Court described acts not in good 
faith245 as occupying the space between “disloyalty in the classic 
sense (i.e., preferring the adverse self-interest of the fiduciary or 
of a related person to the interest of the corporation) [and] gross 
negligence.”246 The concept covered conduct “which does not 
involve disloyalty (as traditionally defined) but is qualitatively 
more culpable than gross negligence.”247 In Stone ex rel v. 
Ritter,248 decided later that year, the Court made explicit that 
good faith fit squarely under the duty of loyalty.249 These and 
later decisions, while shying away from providing a 
comprehensive list of acts not in good faith, made clear that lack 
of good faith would be found only in a situation where a director 
had acted not just with gross negligence but with subjectively bad 
                                                                                                     
 242. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. 
Ch. 1996) (“[T]he core element of any corporate law duty of care inquiry: 
whether there was good faith effort . . . .”). 
 243. Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric 
in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 34 (2005). 
 244. Thompson, supra note 10, at 545–46. 
 245. There was a brief scholarly debate about whether there were actions, 
which were neither in good faith nor met the requirements for bad faith, but, 
more recent work has argued convincingly that there is no middle ground—acts 
are either in good faith or in bad faith. See Leahy, A Decade After Disney, supra 
note 235, at 898–99 (“[T]he no-man’s-land that Nowicki identifies—conduct that 
is neither in good faith nor in bad faith—does not exist.”). 
 246. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006). 
 247. Id. at 66. 
 248. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
 249. See id. at 369–70 (holding that good faith is a “‘subsidiary element,’ i.e. 
a condition” of the duty of loyalty (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 
n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003))). 
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intent;250 such as “intentional dereliction of duty [or in] conscious 
disregard of one’s responsibilities.”251 In a 2009 opinion, Lyondell 
Chemical Co. v. Ryan,252 the Court further narrowed good faith, 
holding, in a case dealing with a company’s sale, that only if 
directors had “knowingly and completely failed to undertake their 
responsibilities,” and had “utterly failed to attempt to obtain the 
best sale price,” would they have not acted in good faith.253 After 
its short day in the sun, good faith seemed to have lost any role as 
a significant check on directorial action.254  
The taming of good faith was part of a movement towards 
simplifying fiduciary duties, in part by “rebifurcating” them—
restoring fiduciary duties to those of loyalty and care.255 That 
impulse to simplify and rationalize the bases for directorial 
liability has now reached waste, which in several recent cases has 
been characterized as an aspect of good faith—more precisely, 
waste has been taken as an indication of lack of good faith.256 
This is a surprise, because the two are conceptually quite distinct. 
The present-day test for waste is objective: waste is a transaction 
so one-sided that no rational business person would enter into 
it.257 One way of determining whether this has occurred is 
whether in the transaction the corporation has received “any 
                                                                                                     
 250. See Strine, Jr. et al., supra note 10, at 689–90 (discussing Disney and 
Ritter). 
 251. In re Disney, 906 A.2d at 64. 
 252. 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009) 
 253. Id. at 243–44; see also Thompson, supra note 10, at 549–51 (discussing 
Disney, Ritter, and Lyondell). 
 254. See Thompson, supra note 10, at 556 (discussing the disappearance of 
the “potential for director liability based on good faith”).  
 255. See Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corporate 
Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1234 (2010) (“[M]any scholars and jurists [seek] 
to return the law of fiduciary duties to greater simplicity.”). 
 256. As others have certainly noted. See Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith, 
State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director Liability in Corporate Law, 
41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1153, 1154 n.103 (2006) (discussing that a waste 
analysis is “really about the ‘good faith’ of the decisionmaker”). The survey 
presented here to some extent, recapitulates earlier discussions. See Leahy, 
Super PAC, supra note 11, at 308–11, and Kastler, supra note 11, at 1911–14 for 
additional information. 
 257. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (quoting In re Walt 
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 362 (Del. Ch. 1998)). 
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substantial consideration.”258 What is not usually asked is 
whether those who authorized the transaction believed it to be a 
good deal or not. A waste allegation may raise further questions 
about the actor’s state of mind (may lead “judicial nostrils [to] 
smell something fishy”),259 but the waste determination itself 
should not rest on the mindset of the actor. The test of good faith, 
in contrast, is clearly subjective—looking to the decision-maker’s 
state of mind.260 And even when waste does point to a fiduciary 
duty breach, there seems no reason to think it must always point 
to a breach of good faith; one could imagine a wasteful 
transaction that on closer examination was produced by gross 
negligence, or was disguised self-dealing.  
The history of waste and, before that, ultra vires, also point 
away from equating waste and good faith. In the nineteenth 
century, it was clear that ultra vires was a very different category 
from the fiduciary duties. As noted above, whether an act was 
ultra vires did not turn on the state of mind of the individuals 
committing the act.261 It was possible furthermore to commit an 
ultra vires act in good faith. Thompson on Corporations, for 
instance, reported a case where, when “trustees of a religious 
corporation, without authority, changed the securities in a trust 
fund from those authorized by law to those unauthorized by law, 
it was held that they were personally liable . . . no matter how 
perfect the good faith with which they made the change.”262  
Several modern cases observed a similar divide between good 
faith and waste. In Gottlieb, for instance, the court apparently 
accepted that the stock options at issue there were granted in 
good faith, yet still remanded to the lower court to determine 
whether the corporation had received consideration for them:  
[h]onest directors conceivably might give away to their 
associates in the enterprise substantial amounts of a 
corporation’s property in the belief that the gift would produce 
                                                                                                     
 258. Id.  
 259. Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 670 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 260. See Strine, Jr. et al., supra note 10, at 633 (discussing good faith as the 
“state of mind required of a loyal director”). 
 261. See supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text (discussing ultra vires). 
 262. See THOMPSON ON CORPORATIONS, supra note 28, at 300. There appears 
to be an exception to this rule for directors who acted with all due care but were 
mistaken as to their powers. Id. at 302. 
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such gratitude that ultimately the corporation’s generosity 
would be more than repaid. There would be nothing immoral 
or dishonest about such an action, but it would not be legally 
sound.263 
Forty years later in Meyerson, Chancellor Allen would state that 
“[t]he waste claim entails no claim of bad faith or conflict of 
interest (if it did it would be a breach of fiduciary duty claim).”264 
And, in several cases, notably both Disney opinions, the Delaware 
Supreme Court analyzed plaintiffs’ waste claims separately from 
those of breach of fiduciary duty.265  
That said, there is to be found in older cases language linking 
waste and fiduciary duties. In McQuillen, one of the earliest cases 
addressing a waste claim, the court stated that waste had to be 
the result of “bad faith, or a total neglect of or indifference to 
[recognized business] practices.”266 In New York it appears to 
have long been the rule that waste required a violation of 
fiduciary duties, with a successful claim needing proof not only of 
a wasteful transaction, but that “directors . . . acted with an 
intent to serve some outside interest, regardless of the 
consequence.”267 
Several early Delaware cases also made this connection. 
1993’s Emerald Partners v. Berlin,268 stated that in “a transaction 
in which the corporation received no consideration . . .” a waste 
claim—a section 102(b)(7) provision would not protect directors 
because “they would have acted in bad faith.”269 More 
                                                                                                     
 263. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 663–64 (Del. Ch. 1952). 
 264. Steiner v. Meyerson, No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 
19, 1995). 
 265. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 73–75 (Del. 
2006) (analyzing waste claims separately from fiduciary duty claims); Brehm v. 
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259–66 (Del. 2000) (analyzing duty of care, waste, and 
“substantive due care” claims). 
 266. McQuillen v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639, 653 (D. Md. 
1939). 
 267. Aronoff v. Albanese, 446 N.Y.S.2d 368, 371 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); 
accord Stern v. Gen. Elec. Co., 924 F.2d 472, 476 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[A]ctions of 
corporate directors are subject to judicial review only upon a showing of fraud or 
bad faith.”). 
 268. Civ. A. No. 9700, 1993 WL 545409, at *1 (Del. Ch. 1993). 
 269. Id. at *8. The question of whether waste could be exculpated under 
section 102(b)(7) was unsettled for a time, with a few cases holding that an 
exculpatory clause would protect a defendant director from a waste claim. See 
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consequentially, in Vogelstein Chancellor Allen, who the year 
before in Steiner had been clear that waste did not necessarily 
entail bad faith,270 wrote a passage connecting the two:  
Roughly, a waste entails an exchange of corporate assets for 
consideration so disproportionately small as to lie beyond the 
range at which any reasonable person might be willing to 
trade. . . . If, however, there is any substantial consideration 
received by the corporation, and if there is a good faith 
judgment that in the circumstances the transaction is 
worthwhile, there should be no finding of waste, even if the 
fact finder would conclude ex post that the transaction was 
unreasonably risky.271 
This injects a subjective element into at least one definition of 
waste. Under this approach, while the complete absence of 
consideration suffices to mark a disputed transaction as wasteful, 
“any substantial” consideration will mean it’s not wasteful, so 
long as an additional element is present: a good faith judgment 
that the transaction was worthwhile.  
The next few years saw several more cases in which waste 
was tied to bad faith (or lack of good faith). Most often the 
connection was that a wasteful transaction indicated that bad 
faith might also be present—that the decision under attack was 
“so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it 
seem[ed] essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad 
faith.”272 If waste signaled bad faith, then the reverse could also 
                                                                                                     
Green v. Phillips, No. 14436, 1996 WL 342093, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 19, 1996) 
(holding that a waste claim not bringing directors’ duty of loyalty and good faith 
into question is covered by section 102(b)(7)). More recently, however, a court 
has refused to dismiss a waste claim by reference to a section 102(b)(7) clause; 
given the trend that conflates waste and good faith, this appears the better 
approach. See Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Abbvie Inc., C.A. No. 10374–VCG, C.A. 
No. 10408–VCG, 2015 WL 1753033, at *14 n.114 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 2015) (“This 
Court has found that, doctrinally, waste is a subset of good faith under the 
umbrella of the duty of loyalty (and thus is not protected by a Section 102(b)(7) 
exculpation provision).”). 
 270. See Steiner v. Meyerson, No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *5 (Del. Ch. 
July 19, 1995) (“The waste claim entails no claim of bad faith . . .”). 
 271. Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 272. Parnes v. Bally Entm’t Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. Ch. 1999) 
(quoting In re J.P. Stevens, 542 A.2d 770, 780–81 (Del. Ch. 1988)). Stevens does 
not directly refer to waste, but rather speaks of a transaction so inadequate as 
to bear “the badge of fraud.” Id. at 781 n.5. 
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be true according to some decisions: the presence of good faith 
showed that a transaction was not waste.273 That is one reading 
to give to the above-quoted language of Vogelstein and it’s echoed 
elsewhere.274  
From here it has been a short step for Delaware courts to 
merge waste and good faith—either by taking waste as 
necessarily entailing an act of bad faith or by asserting that 
waste simply is bad faith, in the process erasing waste’s 
longstanding position outside the fiduciary duty framework. In 
the Disney trial decision, the Chancellor wrote that “[t]he 
Delaware Supreme Court has implicitly held that committing 
waste is an act of bad faith.”275 This falls short of a direct holding, 
but it shows the two doctrines’ overlap, as does an assertion in 
Sample that waste was “sometimes misunderstood as being 
founded on something other than a breach of fiduciary duty.”276 In 
the years since these decisions, the link between waste and good 
faith has only tightened. More than one Chancery opinion has 
treated waste as essentially a signal of a breach of good faith. In 
Hampshire Group Ltd. v. Kuttner,277 for example, the court stated 
that the “waste test is just another way to examine whether a 
fiduciary breach has been committed,”278 while in Cancan 
Development, LLC v. Manno279 the court stated that waste is 
“best understood as one means of establishing a breach of the 
duty of loyalty's subsidiary element of good faith.”280 Most 
recently some courts have directly equated the two. In a 2014 
case, Xcell Energy and Coal Co., LLC v. Energy Investment 
                                                                                                     
 273. See Lewis, 699 A.2d at 336 (“[I]f there is a good faith judgment that in 
the circumstances the transaction is worthwhile, there should be no finding of 
waste . . . .”). 
 274. Or simply quoted, as in Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) 
and In re Nat’l Auto Credit, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. Civ.A. 19028, 2003 WL 
139768, at *13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 10, 2003). 
 275. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 
2005) (citing White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 553–55 (Del. 2001)). 
 276. Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 669 (Del. Ch. 2007) (citing Steiner v. 
Meyerson, Civ. A. No. 13139, 1995 WL 44999 at *6 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1995)). 
 277. C.A. No. 3607-VCS, 2010 WL 2739995, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 12, 2010). 
 278. Id. at *35. 
 279. C.A. No. 6429–VCL, 2015 WL 3400789, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 27, 2015). 
 280. Id. at *20. But see Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752, 786 
(Del. Ch. 2016) (discussing waste as “a means of proving bad faith conduct”). 
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Group, LLC,281 the Chancery Court described waste as a “species 
of breach of fiduciary duty claim,”282 while a year later, in 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transport Authority v. Abbvie Inc,283 
the Chancellor stated that waste is “a subset of good faith under 
the umbrella of the duty of loyalty.”284 Not every case equates the 
waste and good faith,285 but the trend to conflate the two is clear. 
After an eighty-year run, waste’s existence as a freestanding 
doctrine in corporate law may be reaching its end. 
VI. Conclusion: Waste’s Future 
Waste now occupies an uncertain place in Delaware 
corporate law. Recent cases have increasingly tied waste to good 
faith, a move which in turn lodges waste under the fiduciary duty 
of loyalty. Connecting waste to good faith makes sense; as 
discussed above, waste and good faith analyses have often played 
similar roles in corporate law—borrowing from one recent 
decision, each has been invoked as a “‘fiduciary out’ from the 
business judgment rule, for situations where, even though there 
is no indication of conflicted interest or lack of independence on 
the part of directors, the nature of their action can in no way be 
understood as in the corporate interest.”286 But if waste is no 
more than a species of bad faith, then its invocation seemingly 
adds little to good faith analysis, and one is left wondering what 
                                                                                                     
 281. C.A. No. 8652-VCN, 2014 WL 2964076, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2014). 
 282. Id. at *9. 
 283. C.A. No. 10374–VCG, C.A. No. 10408–VCG, 2015 WL 1753033, at *1 
(Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 2015). 
 284. Id. at *14 n.114. The opinion does hedge a bit on this, noting that “the 
existence of an academic debate as to whether that issue is truly settled,” id. 
(citing Kastler, supra note 11, at 1911–14, and Leahy, Super PAC, supra note 
11, at 308–09), and treating plaintiffs’ claim of a breach of good faith separately 
from their waste claim. Id. at 15–16. 
 285. In one recent case, for instance, the Chancery Court wrote that “bad 
faith is similar to the much older fiduciary prohibition on waste, and like waste, 
is a rara avis.” In re Chelsea Therapeutics Int’l Stockholders Litig., No. 9640–
VCG, 2016 WL 3044721, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2016). But note that the 
decision also speaks of the “fiduciary prohibition on waste.” Id. 
 286. See In re Chelsea Therapeutics, 2016 WL 3044721, at *1 (discussing 
good faith). 
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justification remains for a separate doctrine of corporate waste at 
all. 
One argument for retaining waste as a separate doctrine is 
that, historically and conceptually, waste and good faith are 
simply not the same thing. As shown above, waste is an offshoot 
of ultra vires, has long been treated as distinct from the fiduciary 
duties, and is usually measured by an objective test.287 
Good faith, in contrast, has always been tied to fiduciary 
duties and, in its contemporary form, is measured subjectively, by 
the fiduciary’s state of mind.288 Certainly, fiduciary duties have a 
degree of flexibility to respond to unanticipated situations, and 
the fiduciary categories have not been as fixed in the past as one 
might expect,289 but placing waste under good faith would be 
moving it from a conceptual space it has occupied for almost a 
century—a space outside fiduciary duties—and inserting it into a 
fiduciary framework it has not previously inhabited. 
One could also object that, if waste were treated solely as an 
aspect of the duty of loyalty, it would lose much of its power as an 
equitable fail-safe—or safety valve, or fiduciary out (pick your 
term). One of waste’s distinctive (and criticized) features has been 
that a waste claim cannot be extinguished by 
less-than-unanimous shareholder ratification of the challenged 
transaction.290 In this it differs from fiduciary claims, which in 
many instances can be defanged or extinguished by majority but 
non-unanimous shareholder approval.291 In Corwin v. KKR 
Financial Holdings LLC,292 for example, the Delaware Supreme 
                                                                                                     
 287. Albeit with a subjective element at times. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 
A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (“If, however, there is any 
substantial consideration received by the corporation, and if there is a good faith 
judgment that in the circumstances the transaction is worthwhile, there should 
be no finding of waste . . . .”). 
 288. See Strine, Jr. et al., supra note 10, at 643 (“[A] director cannot act 
loyally if she uses her corporate powers in bad faith to pursue improper ends.”). 
 289. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 79, at 413 (discussing the business 
judgment rule and how both duties of care of loyalty were subsumed into it). 
 290. See supra notes 170–178 and accompanying text (discussing waste and 
shareholder ratification). 
 291. Assuming the ratification meets such requirements as being 
disinterested, uncoerced, and informed. See Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 
751 A.2d 879, 900 (Del. Ch. 1999) (discussing the parameters needed to invoke 
the amelioration of fiduciary duty claims). 
 292. 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015). 
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Court held that when “a merger that is not subject to the entire 
fairness standard of review has been approved by a fully 
informed, uncoerced majority of the disinterested shareholders,” 
the transaction is protected by the business judgment rule and 
the sole claim remaining to shareholders will be waste.293 
Furthermore, in this situation the business judgment 
presumption is apparently irrebuttable, leaving waste the only 
possible option for shareholders.294 Other recent cases have also 
indicated that Delaware courts are increasingly open to 
mechanisms that mitigate or eliminate fiduciary duty claims 
following majority, disinterested shareholder approval of the 
challenged transaction.295 If waste claims are determined to be 
fiduciary duty claims, then it seems logical that they too could be 
vulnerable to a non-unanimous shareholder vote, leaving 
dissenting shareholders with no claim at all. (The story may be 
different when transactions have not received proper, or any, 
shareholder ratification.) 
This may however be less a loss than it seems. While courts 
have not as yet held that a waste claim can be extinguished by 
non-unanimous shareholder approval, recent decisions have 
made clear just how dubious courts are of waste claims where 
there has been disinterested shareholder ratification. In Singh v. 
Attenborough,296 decided last year, Chief Justice Strine 
                                                                                                     
 293. Id. at 305–06. The Court stated that this was well-supported by 
Delaware precedent and only thrown into doubt by some unclear language in 
Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 710 (Del. 2009). See id. at 309 n.19. That 
waste is the only claim left to shareholders was suggested in the Supreme Court 
decision and made explicit in the lower court decision. See In re KKR Fin. 
Holdings S’holder Litig., 101 A.3d 980, 990 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“Having not alleged 
waste, plaintiffs’ complaint here will be dismissed if they fail to rebut the 
business judgment presumption.”). 
 294. See Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151, 151–52 (Del. 2016) (stating 
that the waste exception is the only option left). 
 295. See Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 645–46 (Del. 2014) 
(adopting rule that the business judgment standard will be applied to controller 
buyouts if certain conditions are met, including conditioning of the transaction 
on approval of independent, empowered Special Committee and informed, 
uncoerced approval by majority of minority shareholders); see also In re Volcano 
Corp. Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 737–38 (Del. Ch. 2016) (stating that the 
business judgment standard will irrebuttably apply when an informed, 
uncoerced majority of stockholders approve a merger offer under DGCL section 
251(h) by accepting a tender offer). 
 296. 137 A.3d 151 (Del. 2016). 
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hearkened back to Huizinga and his doubts about many waste 
claims.297 “When the business judgment rule standard of review 
is invoked because of a [shareholder] vote,” he stated, “dismissal 
is typically the result. That is because the vestigial waste 
exception has long had little real-world relevance, because it has 
been understood that stockholders would be unlikely to approve a 
transaction that is wasteful.”298 While reducing waste to good 
faith may eliminate its use in cases where there has been proper 
shareholder approval, it may already be effectively useless in 
such cases. 
Whatever objections one might raise to merging waste into 
good faith, there are also arguments to be made in favor of that 
move. For one, waste claims have often hinted at fiduciary 
violations; it has always been difficult to imagine cases of waste 
where someone did not violate his or her fiduciary duties. A 
transaction so irrational as to be wasteful, in other words, is also 
one so irrational as to suggest that directors demonstrated “a 
conscious disregard for [their] duties” in approving it.299 From 
their inception, indeed, waste claims have often appeared to have 
a fictive quality, with allegations of “irrationality” cloaking an 
implication that the transaction benefitted the decision-maker.300 
If waste claims have always carried with them a whiff of 
fiduciary violations, then it may not be a radical leap to treat a 
waste claim as really asserting a fiduciary breach. 
Finally, it could be that waste has so outlived its origins that 
it can no longer survive even as a vestige or anachronism. As this 
Article has shown, waste grew out of ultra vires, and while it was 
born after ultra vires had died, waste still developed in a milieu 
where restrictive corporate statutes and charters were in living 
                                                                                                     
 297. See id. at 152 (discussing waste in reference to disinterested, uncoerced 
shareholder votes). 
 298. Id. at 151–52 (citing Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 
881–82, 901 (Del. Ch. 1999); accord In re Volcano Corp., 143 A.3d at 750 
(“Because volcano’s fully informed, uncoerced, disinterested stockholders 
approved the Merger . . . the business judgment rule irrebuttably applies.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
 299. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009). 
 300. See, e.g., Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933) (challenging extremely 
large bonus payments made to senior executives); Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 
610 (Del. Ch. 1962) (challenging large payments made to investment company’s 
adviser). 
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memory.301 It also developed when at least one of ultra vires’s 
rules, that against corporate gifts, remained strong. Well before 
the twenty-first century, however, that larger conceptual 
framework had simply faded away. Corporation statutes today 
are enabling and not restrictive,302 and corporations’ charters 
typically empower them to engage in “any lawful act or activity” 
for which a corporation may be organized.303 Waste, then, is 
today—and probably has been for many years—a doctrine sui 
generis, not rooted in any larger legal framework governing 
managerial duties. If the original ground from which waste grew 
has long since washed away, perhaps transplanting waste into 
the duty of loyalty is a way to ensure that it will still flourish. 
Such a move could even find support in the historical story 
told here. While corporate waste as a distinctive doctrine was 
developed in the 1930s, courts since the early American republic 
have decried “waste” by corporate managers, and in early cases 
that term was sometimes used to describe the result of a breach 
of fiduciary duties.304 In Robinson v. Smith, the first American 
shareholder derivative suit, the court handed down as a rule that 
directors are “liable, if they suffer the corporate funds or property 
to be lost or wasted by gross negligence and inattention to the 
duties of their trust.”305 Folding corporate waste into good faith 
would, in this view, only be returning to the time when the word 
“waste” described the result of directors’ “inattention to the duties 
of their trust.”306 
*   *   * 
Corporate waste is already recognized as a vestige, an odd 
survival from the first Gilded Age reworked and reworked again 
across the twentieth century by courts and litigants who could 
have cared less about its historical roots. Recently courts have 
                                                                                                     
 301. See supra Part III (“Waste’s Emergence.”). 
 302. JAMES D. COX & THOMAS L. HAZEN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS LAW, § 2.2, 
56 (3d ed. 2011). 
 303. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (“Contents of certificate of 
incorporation.”). 
 304. See supra Part III (looking at areas where waste was usually claimed—
compensation, gifts and political donations—and how waste was thought to be a 
part of the fiduciary duty framework). 
 305. 3 Paige Ch. 222, 231 (N.Y. Ch. 1832).  
 306. Id. at 222. 
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increasingly treated waste as interchangeable with good faith, 
and it may well be that we are witnessing the twilight of waste as 
an independent doctrine. But waste, even if a vestige, is a vestige 
that has from time to time proven useful, providing courts a 
means to cast light onto decisions not always easily reachable by 
more traditional fiduciary claims. Waste may not survive as an 
independent doctrine, but one can hope that the role it played 
will not be abandoned. 
